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Industrial agriculture and protected areas for biodiversity conservation are two major drivers of 
land use policy in the African tropics, with consequences for both biodiversity and rural human 
populations.  In Tanzania, conservation and development have led to the marginalization of 
pastoralists, including and especially rural Maasai. I examine how local perceptions of land use 
and livelihoods are influenced by recent and historical expansion of protected areas and large-
scale industrial crop plantations in Longido, northern Tanzania.  Using the framework of 
political ecology, I situate the emergence of industrial agriculture, especially that of palm oil, and 
protected areas in the African tropics within the historical context of international power 
struggles over access to and control over natural resources.  Through ethnographic interviews, 
ERAMAT© game play, and focus group discussions, I find that shifting gender dynamics, 
increased sedentarization, and the lack of opportunities to participate in and receive benefits from 
conservation activities have resulted in local participants favoring industrial agriculture over 
conservation, though land and water scarcity remain among their top concerns. This paper 
encourages the integration of local knowledges into land use planning to improve environmental, 














Across taxa, habitat loss constitutes the most significant threat to global biodiversity, 
accounting for the majority of extinctions over the past hundred years (Laurence 2010, Brooks et 
al. 2002). Agricultural expansion, wood extraction, and infrastructure development have been the 
leading drivers of habitat loss, with agriculture leading the way (Geist and Lambin 2002, Phalan 
2013). While commercial agriculture has been responsible for much of the deforestation around 
the world since the onset of industrialization, agriculture in the African tropics has remained 
largely dominated by smallholders (Fisher 2010). More recently, however, agricultural 
development in Africa has become increasingly driven by large-scale agribusinesses, which rely 
on highly mechanized production methods and mass conversion of natural habitat into 
plantations (Rudel et al. 2009, Butler and Laurence 2008).  
This shift in cultivation techniques from small-scale to industrial farming poses a serious 
threat to Africa’s biodiversity, as the continent contains a number of biodiversity “hotspots” of 
high species and ecosystem endemism (Myers et al. 2000, Mittermeier et al. 1999). This makes 
the effects of land conversion especially problematic, as even small reductions in biodiversity 
can significantly reduce ecosystem resilience (Hooper et al. 2005). In spite of their ecological 
consequences, industrial systems of production and extraction have articulated with local 
economies in tropical regions, such that a lot of people have come to depend on them as a major 
source of income. A growing body of research in agroforestry and social sciences has revealed, 
however, that these industrial systems have pernicious effects on rural livelihoods as well, thus 
complicating the simple human-environment dichotomy prevalent in international development 
research.  




Simultaneously, environmental organizations around the world have prioritized the 
protection of biodiversity in tropical regions, demanding in some cases nothing less than a 
complete separation of humans from selected ecosystems. These conservation efforts can create 
negative outcomes for local people, as many groups become marginalized as protected areas 
dictate human-environment interactions within their boundaries. The goal of this study is to 
elucidate how these complex systems of development and conservation inform the ways in 
which local people in the African tropics understand and relate to their surrounding ecosystems. 
By exploring local perceptions of human-environment interactions in tropical areas where both 
industrial development and conservation programs intersect with local communities, I analyze 
and contribute to the body of research that seeks to reconcile the goals of conservation with those 
of local people. 
  My guiding question in conducting this research is: how do local people in these critical 
areas interact with the environment in ways that are meaningful to them, and how is this vision 
facilitated or restricted by industrial development and/or conservation projects in their area? As 
one avenue for answering these questions, I conducted a field study in Longido, Tanzania, in 
conjunction with JMU’s East Africa Field School. I collected data on local perspectives of the 
environment through semi-structured interviews, ERAMAT© game play, and focus-group 
discussions to elucidate local perceptions and use of the environment, as well as how these 
relationships have changed over time in response to conservation and development projects that 
each incite and prioritize different ways of engaging with the surrounding ecosystem.  
The ethnographic data from Longido serves as an area case study to explore changing 
livelihoods and landscapes in the African tropics, which I combine with an industry case study of 
palm oil. To this end, I examine the scientific, peer-reviewed literature surrounding palm oil 




agribusiness, a burgeoning industry that is an example of many of the same development and 
conservation challenges that impact the varied landscapes of the African tropics (land 
concessions, displacement of locals, land tenure conflict, and ecological disturbance). The 
literature survey will assess the socioeconomic impacts of industrial oil palm expansion on local 
communities, and examine how such developments influence land use and resource availability 
for locals.  A critical approach combining the area and industry case studies is best suited to 
showing the ways in which large-scale changes in land use in mainland Tanzania can have far-
reaching influence over environmental outcomes, especially where the livelihood vulnerabilities 
associated with water scarcity are concerned. I examine these relationships through the 
framework of political ecology, a critical approach that, as Michael Watts explains in A 
Companion to Economic Geography, “seeks to understand the complex relations between nature 
and society through a careful analysis of what one might call the forms of access and control 
over resources and their implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods” 
(257). Political ecology is an ideal approach to study the intersection of industrial agriculture, 
conservation, and livelihoods because it helps elucidate global patterns of resource appropriation 
while also problematizing the tendency of macro-level economic and historical analyses to 
obscure complex local responses on the ground.  
The goal of this research project is to contribute to a constructive, engaged dialogue 
between local and scientific communities, with the aim of informing both development and 
conservation practitioners in hopes that projects will increasingly integrate local value systems 
with sustainable ecosystem management.  
 
 




Chapter 1: The rise and spread of industrial agriculture in the African tropics, including 
the consequences of foreign direct investment and unequal exchange 
Plantation agriculture in the African tropics, and the export economies that govern them, 
can be traced back to the mercantile colonial regimes led by European nations beginning in the 
1730s (Kirey 2015). Europe was undergoing rapid industrialization and required raw material 
inputs to feed the accelerating metabolism of its urban centers. This came on the heels of so-
called “age of discovery,” during which European settlers came to the African tropics and also 
with a focus on harvesting raw materials and humans for slavery (for a more detailed discussion 
of colonial economies and the slave trade, see Lovejoy 2012). While the entire colonial history 
of Tanzania is beyond the scope of this analysis, I attempt to situate the emergence of 
contemporary industrial agricultural production systems within the historical context of the 
colonial and neocolonial regimes that have influenced human-environment interactions and 
development pathways in the larger region.  
In general, Tanzanian economic history reveals a common thread in terms of large-scale 
agricultural development: programs and policies reflecting colonial interests in cash-crop 
production did not end with national independence, but continues to this day in neocolonial, 
market-oriented economies. I apply an ecostructural approach to foreign investment dependence 
highlighting the potential ecological consequences of “collective human activities” (Jorgenson 
et. al 2007, Jorgenson 2008, Jorgenson 2009) and the concept of unequal exchange (Barbosa 
2009, Shandra et al 2009) to the history of industrial agriculture in the African tropics, and in 
Tanzania specifically, with a special focus on the ways in which structural adjustment policies in 
the 1980s perpetuated colonial biases favoring cash-crop monoculture. These policies have in 
turn exacerbated a number of preexisting resource scarcities that rural residents are 




disproportionately forced to contend with relative to their more affluent counterparts. These 
biases towards industrial agriculture and urbanization have been accompanied by parallel biases 
towards “fortress conservation” approaches to biodiversity management, which I discuss in 
chapter 2.  
An enormous and ever-growing body of literature in postcolonial studies explicitly 
addresses the ways colonial cash-crop economies have become translated over time into 
capitalist ventures through which wealthy nations externalize the labor and environmental costs 
of production to low-income nations (Robbins 2012, Edwards 2014, Barbosa 2009, Pellow and 
Brehm 2013, Rudel et al. 2011, Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2008). Critical to this body of 
work is world systems theory, a conceptual framework which describes the flow of wealth and 
raw materials from poor nations to historically powerful and wealthy nations – and the flow of 
the global waste stream and environmental degradation from wealthy nations to poor (Barbosa 
2009). World system theory built on dependency theory, which political ecologist Paul Robbins 
(2012:56) described as a theoretical framework emphasizing that “the marginal conditions of the 
word’s poorest nations were directly the result of the terms of trade established during the 
colonial period, when most colonized countries were forced to produce primary products, rather 
than more valuable industrial and craft goods.”  Contemporary applications of dependency 
theory focus specifically on the effects of foreign direct investment on both economic 
organization of the host country (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985) and on the environmental 
degradation that results from this organizational structure (Jorgenson et al. 2007). Dependency 
theory has been heavily critiqued by scholars, however, for its failure to portray the complexity 
of local actions and responses to economic transition, and fails to account for government 
corruption at both local and national levels. As I will show in chapters 3, what constitutes 




“development” and what it should look like is often highly contested within the host country 
itself, within rural communities, and even individual households. This chapter, which relies 
heavily on the language of dependency theorists to articulate global trends in primary sector 
exports and the social and ecological consequences that can result from those patterns, is meant 
to highlight these macro-level trends and the discourses circulating around them. In the area case 
study of Longido, Tanzania, I show how actions and relationships on the ground complicate the 
narratives of dependency prevalent in FDI research.  
Foreign direct investment and the creation of the “developing” world 
Generally speaking, foreign direct investment (FDI) is the process by which a corporate 
entity in one country gains “control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an 
enterprise that is resident in another economy; ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary 
shares of voting stock is the criterion for determining the existence of a direct investment 
relationship” (World Bank 2015). FDI increased in prevalence in African nations following the 
“age of structural adjustment” in the 1980s (Edwards 2014), a period during which the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) called for recently independent African nations to break 
down protective trade barriers and open themselves up to foreign investors, especially in the 
primary commodities sector of farming, logging, and mining, to pay off their rapidly accruing 
international debts. The increasingly stringent labor laws and environmental regulations in the 
western world made the prospect of externalizing production to developing countries with fewer 
corporate control mechanisms appealing to corporations in Europe, the U.S, and, more recently, 
middle-income countries such as China, Brazil, and Indonesia.  
The externalization of production to economically vulnerable regions has increased 
dramatically within the last 40 years. Jorgenson (2008) cites data from the UN and OECD to 




illustrate the rapid upswing in transnational ownership: “The presence of foreign investment 
stocks within less-developed countries increased from 4% of their overall GDP in 1980 to 
approximately 28% in 2000.” Given that the proportion of foreign ownership increased 
sevenfold in such a short period of time, the potential socioeconomic and environmental impacts 
of FDI warrant more attention in the international policy arena. 
Barbosa, Jorgenson, Shandra, and others have expanded on FDI research, focusing on the 
ways in which transnational ownership in both primary and secondary/manufacturing sectors in 
tropical nations has led to disproportionate environmental degradation in those host countries. 
Central to this body of research is the concept of ecologically unequal exchange, which holds 
that wealthy nations are able to externalize their resource demands onto developing nations via 
“vertical export flows” (Shandra et al. 2009). In a cross-national analysis of forestry export 
flows, Shandra and colleagues investigate the extent to which low-income nations characterized 
by higher proportions of foreign ownership in the primary sector experience higher levels of 
deforestation. Their analysis, which builds on research by Jorgenson, as well as other 
environmental sociologists and political economists, used a sample of 60 countries and 
conducted cross-national regression models of forest loss from 1990-2005. Their findings 
supported and expanded upon previous research in this area, showing that forestry exports to 
wealthy nations from poor ones are associated with higher rates of deforestation. This is where 
the idea of unequal exchange comes in: because the activity in the forestry sector is controlled by 
entities in a foreign country, the more capital the host country tends to lose. The reason for this is 
that the recipient nation is more likely to control the secondary processing and refining industries 
needed to turn the raw materials into products, thus increasing the market value of what was 
essentially pulled from the ground in a developing nation. As the authors explain, 




“Consequently, it takes more and more natural resource (e.g. forestry) or other primary product 
(e.g. agriculture and mining) exports to buy imports from rich nations” (Muradian and Martinez-
Alier 2001 via Shandra et al. 2009). This is not to say that the host countries have nothing to 
“gain” from FDI in the primary sector: they gain foreign revenue, which could theoretically be 
invested in value-added industries in a more localized market economy. This system of 
exchange, however, is embedded in the “progress narrative” assumptions of modernization 
theory: the idea that industrialization, mechanization of labor, and urbanization of populations is 
what constitutes “development.” Modernization theory has been heavily critiqued for the ways in 
which it imposes western notions of progress and development on non-western production 
systems and perpetuates unsustainable resource consumption (Brahmba 2007, Coffman 2015). 
What Shandra and others emphasize is that market diversification appears to decrease as 
cash crop and forestry exports flow disproportionately to wealthy nations: indicating that these 
low-income nations producing primary sector exports are buying into the “comparative 
advantage” mentality, often with severe consequences for their domestic economies.  In 
“Political Ecology of Famine” (2004), Mike Davis argues that the integration of small-scale 
cultivators into the global economy led to the rapid deterioration of the terms of trade, resulting 
in the market value of products coming out of tropical nations to decrease dramatically. Davis 
cites Arthur Lewis’s observation that: “With the exception of sugar, all the commodities whose 
price was lower in 1913 than in 1883 were commodities produced almost wholly in the tropics” 
(59).  It is from this context of ecologically unequal exchange, Davis argues, that the categorical 
divide between “developing” and “developed” nations emerged—monikers that are 
unfortunately still prevalent in international development and conservation literatures.  These 
categories, which became formalized in the economic policies under Victorian reign in England 




and the Grant administration in the U.S, reflect strong biases towards built infrastructure and 
urbanization in what it means to be “developed.” These biases are both culturally salient and 
historically rooted in the extractive regimes of colonial empires, which is why terms like 
“developing” nations need to be problematized and yet are so difficult to avoid.  
  Thus, we can see what environmental sociologists have called the treadmill of production 
(Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg 2008) inherent in the structure of FDI: low-income nations are 
forced to harvest their natural resources at increasingly unsustainable rates in order to remain 
afloat in the global market. Indeed, the percentage of forest loss in the so-called “developing” 
nations from 1990-2005 was almost twice that of the global average during the same period: 3.5 
and 6 percent, respectively (Jorgenson 2008). I argue that this pattern extends to the community 
level and that degradation is progressively nested: “developed” nations benefit at the expense of 
“developing nations,” which benefit, at the national level in terms of GDP/foreign earnings, at 
the expense of rural communities living in proximity to agricultural, logging, mining 
concessions, and, as I argue in chapter 2, tourism from conservation areas. While the government 
officials and urban elites who support these foreign concessions and accompanying land 
conversions are able to buffer their environmental consequences, rural residents whose 
livelihoods rely directly on the health of that particular ecosystem cannot, and are thus more 
vulnerable to the “shifting risk ecology” of these altered landscapes (Robbins 2012: 110).  
While the focus of this analysis is limited to activities in the primary sector, the same 
trend applies to the secondary, manufacturing sector as well (Jorgenson 2009). Transnational 
corporations are less likely to retrofit their technologies for eco-efficiency and reduced 
emissions, and are more likely to use outdated and highly polluting technologies due to relaxed 
environmental standards in the host countries, leading in many cases to higher rates of infant and 




child mortality (Jorgenson 2009, Prechel and Zheng 2012). The tendency of industrial centers 
and waste repositories to map onto those areas inhabited by the poorest segments of society in 
any nation (Bullard and Johnson 2000), demonstrate the ways in which the far-reaching socio-
ecological consequences of FDI are disproportionately felt by historically marginalized 
populations, thus making its continued proliferation a significant issue from an environmental 
justice perspective. 
The literatures regarding FDI and ecologically unequal exchange demonstrate the 
viability of deforestation and CO2 emissions as indices of both ecological and social degradation. 
Rates of deforestation index livelihood stability not only because of the critical role forests play 
in food security and nutrient and water cycling (see Cotula 2009, Balanchandran et al. 2013, 
Laurence et al. 2014), but for the ways in which these ecological factors influence social ones. 
Shandra and colleagues (2009) cite Thomas Homer-Dixon’s 1999 book Environment, Scarcity, 
and Violence, which highlights the role of resource scarcity and deforestation in marginalizing 
indigenous communities, spreading disease, and increasing rural violence. Mike Davis (2004) 
argues that it was “subsistence adversity,” or the chronic food insecurity brought on by large-
scale production systems, that encouraged people to turn to cash crop cultivation—not 
entrepreneurial opportunity (Davis 2004:58).  My own field experience in rural Tanzania bears 
out these findings in full, as does the literature on the impacts of industrial oil palm on rural 
livelihoods in the nations in which it is produced for export. With this in mind, the collective 
findings of research in this field, which lends support to the hypothesis that countries with higher 
proportions of foreign ownership of primary sector products are more likely to experience high 
levels of deforestation and pollution, strongly suggest that current patterns of FDI are both 
ecologically and socially unsustainable. Analyses of the role of FDI in Tanzania’s primary sector 




and in the palm oil industry demonstrate strong support for the argument that FDI is a structural 
mechanism used to serve neocolonial interests in the African tropics, and that it ultimately leads 
to severe environmental degradation and, consequently, the marginalization of rural populations. 
Further, attempting to resolve one FDI crisis by incorporating another is likely to exacerbate 
problems, as the industry case study of palm oil will demonstrate.  
FDI and unequal exchange in Tanzania’s primary sector and implications for rural livelihoods 
 The economy of mainland Tanzania has undergone a series of dramatic structural 
changes since its independence from Great Britain in 1961, which have resulted in the 
prioritization of industrial agriculture at the expense of smallholder production systems, 
including and especially pastoralism, which has been a critical source of food security as the 
reliance on livestock for nutrition has been historically more reliable than other forms of 
production in Tanzania’s semi-arid landscapes. Prior to Tanzania’s independence, the colonial 
export economy in the form of coffee and sisal plantations began with the Germans in former 
Tanganyika, and increased in prevalence and scale during British rule when the Germans lost 
their colonies at the end of WW1 (Kirey 2015). The key driver of this scale increase, according 
to Tanzanian historian Reginald Kirey, is the high proportion of absentee land ownership in the 
British colonial state. While German-controlled Tanganyika had a relatively strong settler 
economy, plantation management under the British was characterized by oversight from Europe. 
This tendency towards absentee land ownership was likely influenced in part by the Dual 
Mandate governance system employed by the British in Tanganyika, in which Africans deemed 
“traditional” leaders from the mainland were charged with enforcing British rule among the 
colony’s various ethnic groups (Lugard 1922).  




This system of indirect rule, which was portrayed by Lugard and other members of the 
colonial government to be for the benefit of the colonies, created a fundamental separation 
between the land and land management in regards to the export economy. Arguably, in other 
words, the beginnings of the capitalistic externalization of labor and agricultural production were 
manifest in the absentee land ownership of British colonialism in Tanzania. Living in Western 
urban centers and “managing” plantations over seven thousand miles away closely resembles the 
structure of transnational corporations today, which as many researchers in the Marxist tradition 
have critiqued for their inherently counter-ecological nature. In Gould, Pellow and Schnaiberg’s 
The Treadmill of Production, the authors draw attention to the ways in which market-oriented 
economies such as that which emerged in Tanzania with the advent of absentee land ownership 
during British colonial rule ignore ecological principles of carrying capacity, limiting factors, 
and minimum thresholds of stressors. They are “able” to do so until the resource in question is 
depleted or severely compromised because their management is physically and mentally not 
there. An absentee government official does not experience and is not personally affected by the 
impacts of large-scale agriculture on water and nutrient cycling in the African tropics, does not 
feel the strain of resource scarcity it produces, and thus expanding the profit margins by 
expanding production is regarded as the only desirable option in a climate of fierce competition 
with other nations or corporate entities. This is not to say that corporate irresponsibility in 
regards to land management needs to be foreign-owned and managed in order to have severe 
negative ecological and social consequences. There are, for example, numerous cases of 
government-controlled and parastatal enterprises being equally problematic (Edwards 2014, 
Kherallah et al. 2002). Again, however, these parasitic state-owned enterprises are usually 
located in places geographically distant from the affected region.  




Under discussion here is the emergence of economies of scale; the idea that a corporate 
entity can increase its profit margins by spreading “fixed” production costs over more units of 
output (Coffman 2015). In other words, it literally “pays” for a corporate entity to be bigger, 
because the cost associated with production (labor, material inputs) are treated as static or at least 
able to be reduced per unit of output, even if the price per unit declines somewhat as well. To use 
plantation agriculture as an example, if it costs X amount of money to purchase the land, 
maintain a labor population, and transport the product to its recipient country, the managing 
entity would maximize profit from the venture by increasing crop yields, having the same area of 
land produce twice as much product. The solution, then, from a market-oriented perspective, is to 
intensify agricultural production on that same plot of land, and that has happened most recently 
through monoculture, the use of fertilizers and herbicides, and the mechanization of labor and 
resulting fossil fuel reliance. The ways in which economies of scale were imposed on the 
landscape of Tanzania in colonial times laid the foundation for the neocolonial transnational 
development schemes that would emerge following Tanganyika’s independence in 1961 and the 
merging of Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania in 1964.  
Tanzania’s post-colonial history is notable for its socialist organization under the nation’s 
first president, Julius Nyerere, whose goal was to foster a unified national identity as opposed to 
ethnic ones through expanding agricultural “peasant” production (Kirey 2015, Iliffe 1979). 
Central to his approach was the policy of villagization, or “Ujamaa” in Kiswahili, which 
mandated the movement of millions of people to government-owned agricultural centers from 
1965-1985 (Edwards 2014). Nyerere’s philosophy behind the collectivization of agricultural 
production, which he detailed in the Arusha Declaration of 1965, included the desire for 
“equitable economic production and distribution, national ‘self-reliance,’ and non-exploitative 




development” (Ibhawoh and Dibua 2003). As Sebastian Edwards explains in Toxic Aid: 
Economic Collapse and Recovery in Tanzania, Nyerere was deeply ambivalent about the role of 
the Bretton-Woods institutions in shaping Tanzania’s economic profile, and wanted to achieve 
what he envisioned as relative economic independence from donor nations through the 
establishment of protective trade barriers and government control over primary production 
(Edwards 2014). While a full examination regarding the impacts of Nyerere’s socialism on the 
Tanzanian economy is beyond the scope of this analysis, the collectivization of agriculture under 
the nation’s first president highlights two key factors regarding industrial agriculture and rural 
livelihoods. The first is that even in Nyerere’s concentrated efforts to prioritize “Tanzanian” 
interests, rural residents were forced out of their traditional livelihood patterns and were made to 
participate in Nyerere’s agrarian vision, which did not, as we will see in our discussion of Maasai 
livestock herding practices, necessarily reflect the reality of peasant production in the post-
colonial state. Going back to the idea of progressively nested degradation, Nyerere sought to 
expand the primary sector for “development” at the national level, but used colonial-style 
measures to suppress rural opposition, as seen with the Land Acquisition Act of 1967, which 
gave the president the power to seize any land for any public purpose, greatly reducing 
smallholder property rights (Legum and Mmari 1995, Edwards 2014).  This act is one 
representative of environmental conflict and exclusion (Robbins 2012) that took place during 
Nyerere’s administration, as resources were appropriated for state operations and wrested from 
local control. As Edwards explained regarding the Land Acquisition Act: “Owners whose 
properties were chosen for purchase had no legal recourse and were forced to sell; compensation 
was contemplated, but in almost every case it was merely nominal” (75). The tenuous nature of 
smallholder land rights is the common thread that unites Nyerere’s socialist policies with the 




foreign land concessions of today, a connection that re-emerges in discussions of both palm oil 
and conservation areas.  
Nyerere’s socialist approach did have a number of positive outcomes, including 
significant reductions in child and infant mortality and increases in life expectancy, on average, 
from 37 years in 1960 to 52 years in 1984 (Legum and Mmari 1995). In spite of the many 
benefits accrued at the national level, there were a number of significant unintended 
consequences for rural residents. Longido, as I detail in chapter 3, is one such legacy of 
Nyerere’s policy, as the Maasai in that area were moved there from other regions and were 
concentrated there from a previously wider distribution during the time of villagization. The 
second reason I want to draw attention to the collectivization of agriculture under Nyerere is to 
demonstrate that the bias towards agriculture (particularly large-scale operations) over other 
forms of primary production was already manifest in socialist Tanzania, even though the 
mechanisms of control were located in the national government rather than in foreign corporate 
entities. This prioritization of large-scale agriculture, combined with the outbreak of war with 
Uganda in 1978 and preexisting inequalities in the global market, led to the collapse of sisal and 
coffee plantation economies in the 1970s (Edwards 2014). This in turn created severe economic 
instability in Tanzania, making the national government vulnerable and more open to accepting 
the stipulations of austerity measures by the Bretton-Woods institutions in the 1980s. 
By 1978, almost 60% of Tanzania’s development budget was financed by foreign aid, 
(much of which came from the Nordic countries, the U.S., and Europe) and tensions were 
mounting rapidly between the Nyerere administration and the donor community. IMF officials 
led by Bo Karlstrom met with Nyerere in 1979 in an attempt to persuade him to devalue the 
Tanzanian shilling, which had a black market/official exchange rate difference of almost 200% 




in 1977 (Edwards 2014). At this meeting, Nyerere refused to accept the terms of devaluation and 
expelled the IMF from the country. Edwards quotes Nyerere stating in an allocution to the 
diplomatic corps: “The IMF has an ideology of social and economic development which it is 
trying to impose on poor countries irrespective of their own clearly stated policies. And when we 
reject IMF conditions we hear the threatening whisper: ‘without accepting our conditions you 
will not get our money, and you will get no other money,” (2014: 97).  
In spite of the rift between Nyerere and the IMF, foreign aid and its attendant—and often 
competing, depending on where the aid was coming from—development ideologies continued to 
flow into the country through the 1980s, particularly from the Nordic countries and, perhaps 
more significantly from an ecological perspective, China. Chinese development projects, 
including and especially railway lines, including the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority 
(TAZARA), brought the demand for wildlife products such as ivory to the global market, 
resulting in massive outbreaks of poaching that still continue today (Challender and MacMillan 
2014, Warchol et al 2003). After a series of failed “homegrown” structural adjustment programs 
aimed at reforming the state-owned primary sector activities and adjusting producer prices 
(National Economic Survival Program- NESP in 1981, NESP 2 in 1982, and the Structural 
Adjustment Program of 1983) a group of Tanzanian officials chaired by member of Parliament  
Simon Mbilinyi released a report critiquing the poor performance of the primary sector, 
recommending greater protection of smallholder property rights and (ironically) the 
encouragement of commercial farms, with a reduction of government controls along the supply 
chain (Edwards 2014). The irony of promoting both the protection of smallholder property rights 
and the expansion of commercial agriculture at the same time is that the latter often results in the 
displacement of the former in practice, as legal recourse mechanisms to reclaim land are often 




only nominal (Cotula 2009, Klopp 2000, Southall 2005).  What this did was set the stage for the 
exploration of different pathways through which to increase foreign revenue earnings, and one of 
the pathways that gained ground during this time was to increase foreign revenue through the 
privatization of government-owned industries. Export crops were liberalized, and by 1994 the 
private sector accounted for over 90% of trade, and export crops, such as tea, coffee, cotton, 
cashews, pyrethrum, and tobacco, increased by 68% (Mans 1994).  
Among the major drivers of the liberalization of cash crops is the notion of comparative 
advantage, the idea that “resource-rich” previously colonized nations can capitalize on their 
natural resources through export economies in the primary sector (Edwards 2014). The problem 
with this links back to the critiques of ecologically unequal exchange research: international 
economic institutions like the IMF and World Bank, as well as other multinational finance 
agencies, tell multiple developing countries that same message, making the global market prices 
fall dramatically as the number of low-income nations exporting raw materials and cash crops 
increases. Meanwhile, wealthy countries continue to dominate the value-added manufacturing 
industries, and sell the finished products of those raw materials at higher prices (Gould, Pellow, 
and Schnaiberg 2008, Coffman 2015). In spite of its neocolonial, extractive tendencies, the 
notion of comparative advantage in agriculture and natural resource extraction has continued to 
drive sectorial policy in Tanzania, resulting in a number of implications for smallholder 
production systems and rural livelihoods. 
The spread of large-scale production in Tanzania’s primary sector continued to expand 
under Presidents Mwinyi (1985-1995) and Mkapa (1995-2005), both of whom focused on 
combatting the economic stagnation left in Nyerere’s wake through market-oriented reform 
initiatives (Edwards 2014). Encouraging FDI was a major part of these approaches, and both the 




agricultural and mining sectors quickly attracted private investors hoping to export cash crops 
and valuable minerals such as Tanzanite (Helliesen 2012, Robbins et al 2012). 
The election of Jakaya Kikwete in 2005 further solidified Tanzania’s gradual change 
towards market orientation in the primary sector.  Pivotal in this transition was the creation of 
Vision 2025, which called for substantial economic growth in order to achieve middle-income 
status by 2025 and significantly reduce poverty (Edwards 2014). One of the main features of 
Vision 2025 was the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction, of MKUKUTA, 
which was launched by president Kikwete in 2009. This document, which was drafted in 
collaboration with the Bretton Woods institutions, outlined a set of implementation plans through 
which Tanzania would achieve the targets set forth by Vision 2025. Beneath MKUKUTA lies 
yet another layer of the bureaucratic hierarchy of Tanzania’s emerging administrative regime: the 
Kilimo Kwanza, or “Agriculture First” program, which as Edwards explains is geared towards 
encouraging the development of the private sector, including FDI, in large-scale agriculture, and 
expanding food production for both domestic consumption and exports (225). By this time, 
agriculture comprised over 80% of the workforce and accounted for 27% of national income 
(227).  
As Maasai elder and International Panel on Climate Change (2011) representative Alais 
Morindat explained, the stated principles of Kilimo Kwanza directs sectorial policies, including 
“Quick Results Now” (QRN): a bilateral partnership between Tanzania and Malaysian economic 
advisers in which Malaysian economists advise Tanzania on “how to develop the nation through 
large-scale agriculture” (Morindat 2015). The potential social and ecological implications of 
Malaysia being the country influencing Tanzania’s development trajectory are profound. 
Malaysia achieved its position in the global market through the systematic conversion of the 




nation’s tropical forests and peat swamps into industrial oil palm monocultures, with 
approximately 880,000 hectares of tropical peatlands having been converted to oil-palm 
plantations by the early 2000’s (Koh et al. 2011). Additionally, studies have shown that almost 
60 percent of this palm oil development in Malaysia occurred directly at the expense of intact 
forest (Koh and Wilcove 2008, Koh et al. 2011, Pye 2009). 
  There is new evidence that Tanzania is looking to break into the palm oil market, 
although there is no empirical or scholarly research to date exploring the mechanisms and 
implications of this proposed market entry. As reported on 11 October 2015 via African Echo: 
Tanzania is keen to tap Malaysian expertise to help develop its palm oil industry, 
especially for the production of bio-fuels. Patricia Mhondo, the investment promotion 
manager of the Tanzania Investment Centre, said more than 160,000 hectares suitable for 
oil palm and jatropha production have already been identified (Tanznania 2015). 
The Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), which was created in 1997 through the Tanzania 
Investment Act, is “the Primary Agency of the Government to coordinate, encourage, promote 
and facilitate investment in Tanzania and to advise the Government on investment policy and 
related matters” (TIC 2015). The report quoted Patricia Mhondo stating: “We chose Malaysia 
because it is the second largest crude palm oil producer in the world. Only six percent of the 
cultivated land in Tanzania was under palm oil plants, which was why Dar es Salaam was 
looking for Malaysian expertise to increase palm oil cultivation” (Tanzania 2015). As a crop 
native to the tropical forest ecosystems of West Africa that requires high water inputs, the further 
proliferation of large-scale oil palm development schemes on the other side of the continent 
could have serious ecological costs, especially given the already-severe water scarcity issues in 
the region.  




This bilateral partnership between Tanzania and Malaysia is yet another example of 
agricultural bias in the national agenda that continues to persist in decisions of program 
development and policy structure, and it is facilitated by the existence of official entities like 
TIC, which explicitly encourage foreign direct investment. Does this kind of export-oriented 
cash crop and mining system “make sense” from an ecological standpoint? In other words, how 
does it work within the context of the semi-arid savanna/steppe ecosystems of East Africa 
relative to other primary production systems, including and especially pastoralism?  
Pioneering research by ecologist Robin Reid indicates that agriculture in East Africa is in 
many ways ecologically “mismatched” to the environment in which it is situated. As she 
explains in Savannas of Our Birth: People, Wildlife, and Change in East Africa, East African 
semiarid grassland ecosystems, specifically those of Kenya and Tanzania, have been 
characterized by a bimodal pattern of rainfall for the past 3,000 years (Reid 2012). Bimodal 
rainfall means that there is a short and a long rainy season, interspersed with dry seasons. Reid 
argues that the pastoral mode of production evolved along with this ecosystem over thousands of 
years for the reason that rains are temporally “spread out,” which keeps grass growing and 
animals fed. From an energetics perspective, it is more ecologically efficient to maintain 
livestock, especially cattle, because bimodal rainfall allows them to produce milk continuously 
for longer periods of time (49). Moreover, the inherent mobility of pastoralism allows the people 
to sustain their production while simultaneously preventing any one area from being overgrazed. 
Mobility is a critical aspect of pastoralism, and one that has been greatly curtailed, as I discuss in 
chapter 3.  
Agriculture, conversely, was not prevalent in this region historically because it is better 
suited to ecosystems with unimodal rainfall patterns, which sustain crop yields with one long, 




heavy rainy season (49). Furthermore, crop cultivation requires sedentary, rather than mobile, 
patterns of residence. During dry seasons, people could not move their crops to areas with more 
rainfall, and it was not until the advent of modern irrigation systems that large-scale crop 
cultivation was even a possibility. Reid supplements this contemporary ecological evidence with 
archaeological evidence, which shows that during the Bantu expansion (c. BC 2000 – AD 1000), 
West African migrants began to adopt pastoral subsistence practices over farming as they moved 
eastward from the tropical forest ecosystems of what is now Nigeria and Cameroon (Reid 2012, 
Coffman 2015).  
The basic ecological and human resource inputs of industrial agriculture greatly impact 
and even reconfigure the land and local people. Perhaps the most pressing resource demands 
created by agriculture are water-related: Döll and Siebert estimate that almost 90% of the global 
water consumption is for irrigation purposes, and more than 40% of the crops are produced under 
irrigated conditions (Döll and Siebert 2002), a figure that has likely grown in recent years. 
Broadly speaking, agriculture on a large scale requires the systematic collection and transport of 
vast quantities of water from one place to another. The consequences of this diversion will be felt 
more strongly in drought prone areas like those of East Africa, and research by Dr. Madaka 
Tumbo of the Institute of Resource Assessment at the University of Dar es Salaam supports this 
prediction. The Ruaha river basin, as she explained, covers about 20% of Tanzania, and 
hydroelectric power plants along the river supply about 50% of the nation’s electricity. The basin 
has been experiencing severe drying trends since the 1990s due to global and regional changes in 
climate, and her research team is currently investigating what appears to be a disruption of the 
bimodal rainfall pattern discussed above, and which Reid described as an essential component of 
the grassland ecosystem. Within the last 20 years, the short rains have often failed and the long 




rains have become increasingly erratic and severe, resulting in periods of drought and flash 
flooding. There is also a general trend in temperature increase, with wet seasons becoming 
“warmer and wetter” and dry seasons becoming “warmer and drier” (Tumbo 2015). Furthermore, 
these disruptive patterns are also inciting conflict between irrigation agriculturalists, herders, and 
hydropower suppliers, who must deal with the scarcities produced by the drying trends. Based on 
previous discussion of primary sector investment and export reliance, it is unsurprising that 
industrial agriculture is the largest controller of water, followed by hydroelectric power 
suppliers. Tumbo explains that local people who suffer from rural poverty rely on water 
extraction to meet their daily needs, and yet they are often prohibited from using water sources. 
As a result, they continue to do so illegally. The trends indicated by Dr. Tumbo’s research in the 
Ruaha river basin are borne out on the national level: aggregate freshwater withdrawal data from 
the World Bank and CIA for Tanzania show that roughly 89% of total freshwater withdrawal is 
for agricultural purposes, while domestic usage accounts for only 10% (CIA 2015, World Bank 
2015). With a rural population of 35 million—more than double the urban population of roughly 
16 million (World Bank 2015)—Tanzania’s citizenry experiences vastly disproportionate rates of 
water consumption, which reflect competing and structurally incommensurate interests in the 
national policy arena. In addition, the preexisting vulnerability of the land and its inhabitants to 
droughts is exacerbated by both global and regional changes in climate. These changes are in 
turn worsened and perpetuated by the appropriation of large quantities of water for large-scale 
agriculture, which may not be well suited to the ecological contours of the region to begin with 
(Reid 2012).  
Alais Morindat held a similar view: “agriculture cuts up the earth. It takes at least 25 
years for the land to heal itself—and that is with good management” (Morindat 2015). While the 




exact number of years soil repair actually takes in East Africa after cropping is highly variable, 
depending on area and use, studies have shown that cropping in the semi-arid environments of 
sub-Saharan Africa can lead to severe nutrient depletion and erosion (Sanchez 2002, Vanlauwe 
and Giller 2006).  Morindat echoed Jorgenson and Barbosa when he claimed, “Poor countries 
and marginal communities need to be prepared for powerful economic forces influencing 
government decisions.” As a Maasai elder, Morindat is an advocate for the pastoral mode of 
production. Along with its deep cultural significance, he points out that pastoralism is also “the 
backbone of the commercial livestock center for both domestic and foreign markets.” According 
to Morindat, pastoralists remain severely under-represented in the policy arena due to their 
historically subaltern position in post-colonial society. National policies geared towards 
agriculture have led to the landscape becoming increasingly partitioned, as land and water are 
appropriated for industrial agriculture, leading to the disruption of pastoral mobility and 
traditional grazing patterns, resulting in negative ecological and social outcomes. He stated: 
“Pastoralists live in drought-prone areas. But over time, pastoralists have developed complex 
strategies to mitigate the effects of environmental uncertainties.”  This echoes the central point 
Dr. Tumbo emphasized in her discussion of climate change and freshwater withdrawal: the risks 
associated with living in the semiarid ecosystems of East Africa are 1) becoming more severe 
and 2) disproportionately felt by rural residents—both as a direct result of industrial agriculture. 
Morindat provided evidence from Longido District to illustrate the consequences of these 
imposed water scarcities: “Longido did not get sufficient rains this year (2015), and are headed 
into the second dry season. Last year they lost 70% of their livestock” (Morindat 2015).   
Manifest in the phenomena Morindat describes is a kind of “shifting baseline syndrome” 
(Coffman 2015) or positive feedback loop due to climate change combining with increasing land 




enclosure and appropriation. Water withdrawal by industrial agriculture worsens the effects of 
global climate change, which is compounded as water withdrawal continues and increases as 
more land is converted to large-scale farming operations. The breakdown of critical social 
“safety nets” which have historically helped to absorb the impacts of naturally-occurring 
vulnerabilities resulting from the uneven distribution of water, accelerate the process of 
ecological degradation and socioeconomic marginalization by forcing rural residents to rely on 
increasingly resource-depleted environments. Population growth compounds these resource 
scarcities by making more people rely on diminishing resources. While per-capita needs have not 
changed (in terms of food security, social wellbeing, etc.), per-capita land holdings are going to 
continue to decline as more people are born. In Chapter 3, I show the ways in which rural 
residents in Longido, Tanzania, are responding to the pressures of population growth. Many 
worry about how they will divide their land and other assets among their children—especially as 
the land becomes increasingly susceptible to severe droughts. Morindat emphasizes that drought 
is “common—not a crisis.” Morindat thus acknowledges what Robin Reid and others have 
articulated in the scientific literature—that cyclical drought events are a natural part of the East 
African landscape, but that those cycles have been accelerating and becoming more severe (Reid 
2012, Mayani et al. 2012). The “crisis,” then, is rather the combination of worsening drought 
conditions and the scarcities imposed by the disruption of residential mobility patterns. 
Morindat’s overall message is essentially that agricultural practices and production systems are 
prioritized in national development schemes, resulting in the appropriation of land for 
agribusiness and the restriction of pastoral mobility. This in turn forces many pastoral families to 
adopt farming practices – the very mode of production that produced the resource scarcities in 
the first place. Industrial agriculture represents a very powerful set of interests in Tanzania that 
are consistently reinforced in spite of their social and ecological consequences. The long history 




of export-oriented economies of scale originated with imperial mercantilism, was fostered post-
independence through Nyerere’s agrarian vision and the influence of the donor community, and 
continues today through foreign direct investment and its emphasis on the so-called 
“comparative advantage” of primary sector activities such as palm oil production in low-income 
tropical nations like Tanzania. 
As the focus of this thesis is the confluence of conservation and industrial agricultural 
development in the African tropics, I outline consequences the industrial palm oil sector has had 
on rural livelihoods in other tropical regions from the peer-reviewed scientific and grey 
literatures, from which I extrapolate the potential future consequences facing rural livelihoods as 
the sector makes its way into East Africa. I argue that based on the evidence from the palm oil 
literature regarding negative impacts on tropical ecosystems and on rural livelihoods, combined 
with site-specific issues of water scarcity, historical patterns of primary sector export economies, 
and contested land tenure with the development of conservation areas, the adoption of a large-
scale palm oil industrial complex in Tanzania would eventually prove disastrous for both rural 
residents and the environment.  
As a materialist perspective that prioritizes historically situated power struggles over 
access to and control over resources, political ecology can lend insights into the development and 
expansion of industrial oil palm plantations in the humid tropics. Specifically, the degradation 
and marginalization thesis can be used to critically examine the development trajectory of this 
global, non-food, export crop in tropical regions because of its attention to the ways in which 
patterns of environmental degradation line up with historical patterns of marginalization, which 
often occur along class, ethnic, and gender lines, and the framework of environmental conflict 
and exclusion helps draw out the ways in which environmental spaces are contested both within 




and between local interest groups (Robbins 2012). While these theses offer valuable insights into 
macro-level environmental and economic processes, they run the risk of obscuring the everyday 
resistance of people involved, and can flatten groups of individuals with often conflicting voices 
into “interest groups” and “communities” (what Jennifer Coffman calls “unnatural collectives”) 
in an effort to simplify the neocolonial narrative of rapacious capitalist extraction and 
production. As ethnographic data collection in areas in proximity to palm oil plantations was not 
a part of this research, the scope of analysis regarding palm oil development is necessarily 
limited to macro-level trends collated from the existing literature. In spite of these limitations, 
the section regarding local perceptions of land use and livelihood in Longido illustrates the 
complexity (and often discord) of local responses to large-scale development projects—although 
palm oil has only recently made its way into the Tanzanian national agenda.  
Even a cursory historical overview of palm oil development reveals the processes of 
degradation and marginalization and environmental conflict and exclusion at work. As a plant 
species native to West and Central Africa, archaeological evidence suggests humans began 
experimenting with oil palm cultivation about six thousand years ago (Lynn 2002). It was not 
until the onset of imperialist contact in the 1700s, however, that the purposeful conversion of 
land for oil palm cultivation scaled-up, as European powers used oil palm products to fuel their 
rapidly industrializing economies (Lynn 2002, Hartley 1988, Law et. al 2013). The multinational 
consumer goods corporation, Unilever, provides an example of a present-day capitalist enterprise 
that has its roots in the colonial regime, as Sir William Lever obtained the original Lever 
Brothers land concession for palm oil cultivation in Belgian-controlled Congo in 1911, which 
was seized from the local population (Duignan and Gann 1975, Oosterveer 2015, Linder and 
Palkovitz 2016 forthcoming).  Colonial export thus formalized processes of resource extraction 




that had already begun to unfold in the region, and indigenous people were expelled and 
relocated to make room for migrant workers living in corporate-owned settlements with poor 
living conditions (Linder 2013, Linder and Palkovitz 2016 forthcoming).  This process continues 
today in Southeast Asia and the Congo basin, as political unrest has led to the establishment of 
mass transmigration programs by national governments (Konings 1993, Njoh 2002, McCarthy 
and Cramb 2009, Shoneveld 2014).  
Palm Oil was then introduced to Indonesia and Malaysia, where it quickly began to thrive 
due to the ideal climate conditions of the Southeast Asian tropical rainforests. By 1975, Malaysia 
surpassed the entire African continent in palm oil production (Teoh 2002). This was made 
possible by international development schemes in the 1960’s that encouraged foreign investors, 
and by the following decade 60% of the land area dedicated to palm oil plantations was in the 
hands of private enterprises, 30% owned by the government, and a mere 10% managed by 
smallholders (Teoh 2002). In 2005, Malaysia’s palm oil production was six times what it was in 
1975, and the same 30-year period saw the country’s forest cover reduced by 20% (Wicke 2011, 
Koh and Wilcove 2008, Linder and Palkovitz 2016 forthcoming). The scaling-up of palm oil 
exports in the region also came at the expense of domestic food production: Indonesia has spent 
more money on importing food since 2011 than it made in palm oil exports (Rhein 2014). 
Together, Malaysia and Indonesia accounted for 85% of the world’s palm oil production 
in 2013 (FAO 2015), as the African palm oil sector has, until recently, remained largely 
controlled by smallholder producers (Poku 2002, Corley and Tinker 2003, Rudel 2013, Wich et 
al. 2014, Linder and Palkovitz 2016 forthcoming). This has begun to change over the past 30 
years, however, with what primatologist Joshua Linder (2013) has called a “new wave” of 
industrial oil palm taking hold in the crop’s native continent. National governments in West and 




Central African nations facilitate this “new wave” through economic policies geared towards 
increasing GDP by attracting foreign investors: allowing corporations rights to timber, water, and 
minerals in the concession areas, and requiring only low rent payments (Hawkins and Chen 
2011, Nguiffo and Schwartz 2012), often to the exclusion of local residents (Dewiet et. al 2005, 
Colchester et. al 2006, Cote and Cliche 2011, Cramb and Curry 2012).  
This prioritization of primary-sector foreign investment in the form of large-scale oil 
palm plantations underway in West and Central Africa mirrors the conditions that led to the rapid 
deforestation and concurrent displacement of rural residents in Southeast Asia, leading to 
growing concerns regarding the ecological and socioeconomic sustainability of these endeavors 
(Fentrenie 2012, Rival and Levang 2014, Friends of the Earth 2008, Rainforest Action Network 
2014).  Despite these well-publicized concerns, palm oil has been described by development 
advocates in corporate and government arenas alike as being “liquid gold” (Oladipo 2008): a 
boon to so-called “developing nations” in equatorial regions that promises entry into a long-
awaited position in the global market.  What constitutes a state’s well-being is clearly contested, 
and political ecology offers ways to put these divergent perspectives in direct conversation.  
The legacy of colonialism in the so-called “development” of Sub-Saharan Africa has not 
been the only shaper of land use in these areas, however. The rise of protected areas—that is, 
land set aside for biodiversity conservation purposes—has also contributed to changing social 
and ecological landscapes in the African tropics. In the next chapter, I outline the development of 
protected areas around the world (though focusing on the African tropics) and attempt to situate 
their activities within the historical context of globalization, population growth, and rural 
livelihoods.  
 




Chapter 2: Protected areas: balancing biodiversity conservation and human livelihoods in 
the African tropics 
According to the World Bank (2015), 14.3% of the terrestrial area on Earth is considered 
“protected,” which the World Bank defines as: 
Totally or partially protected areas of at least 1,000 hectares that are designated by 
national authorities as scientific reserves with limited public access, national parks, 
natural monuments, nature reserves or wildlife sanctuaries, protected landscapes, and 
areas managed mainly for sustainable use. Marine areas, unclassified areas, littoral 
(intertidal) areas, and sites protected under local or provincial law are excluded.  
As this definition excludes local, community-based conservation projects as well as areas 
covering less than 1000 hectares, these figures likely underestimate the amount of land under 
some form of purposeful designation as an area that to some extent excludes land conversion.  
  A comparison of protected area coverage and average annual deforestation rates between 
the U.S. and Tanzania reveals disparities informed by a complex web of economic and 
ecological factors. In total, 32.2% of Tanzania’s terrestrial land area is under protected area 
management (up from 27.3% in 1990). To put this in perspective, the U.S. has only 13.8% of its 
terrestrial land area protected, though it is nearly ten times as large as Tanzania (CIA World 
Factbook 2014). In addition, while Tanzania’s average annual deforestation rate is 1.13%, the 
U.S. is actually reforesting, with an average annual deforestation rate of -0.13%: over a hundred 
percent less forest conversion than Tanzania. In a strictly ecological sense, these disparities seem 
consistent: Tanzania has a much higher rate of species and ecosystem endemism, which when 
coupled with higher deforestation rates equates to more biologically “rare” species being more 
highly threatened by habitat loss associated with land conversion for agricultural or other forms 




of industrial development (Mittermeier et. al 1999, Myers et. al 2000, Brooks et. al 2002).  
Recalling the larger macroeconomic trends of wealthy nations like the U.S. externalizing 
production to low-income countries and the positive feedback loop of ecologically unequal 
exchange in the primary sector, however, the political contours of protected area development 
begin to emerge. 
The goal of this chapter is to provide a brief topical overview of protected area 
development and the environmental discourses surrounding perceptions of human-environment 
interactions in the African tropics. Site-specific data for conservation areas in Tanzania are 
detailed in chapter 3. 
Not all conservation areas are created equal in term of their levels of separation from 
human activities, and thus potential for local conflict. In northern Tanzania, for example, 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) often surround core conservation areas and/or national 
parks, such as Ngorongoro Conservation Area and Tarangire National Park. Ngorongoro is a 
multi-use conservation area that allows local pastoralists to inhabit the area and graze their cattle, 
but prohibits crop cultivation above subsistence level, which has been argued by some social 
scientists to provide insufficient means for the local Maasai to maintain healthy levels of 
nutrition (McCabe et. al 1992). Over 20 years after McCabe and colleagues conducted their 
research, conditions have only worsened for the Maasai of Ngorongoro, as the human population 
has increased significantly and the Maasai are not allowed to live in the crater, but in designated 
villages on the periphery (Coffman 2015). In light of these emerging conflicts between 
conservation activities and rural livelihoods, I explore the ways in which the land use policies of 
the international conservation regime are situated within historical power struggles between 
interest groups.  I argue that protected areas have, in some cases, evolved over time to create an 




ever-more exclusive and prescribed set of relationships between humans and their environment, 
with significant implications for local people living in proximity to prioritized ecosystems.  
Environmental discourses informing global perceptions of local human-environment interactions 
Environmental sociologist Robert Brulle delineates seven environmental discourses that 
have been prevalent throughout U.S/Western European history and that have shaped the kinds of 
environmental interactions perceived as beneficial or harmful: manifest destiny, 
conservationism, preservationism, ecocentrism, deep ecology, political ecology, and 
ecofeminism (Brulle 1996). Each comes with a set of expectations regarding the ideal 
relationship between humans and the environment, and each was borne out of a very specific set 
of historical circumstances and reflect global relationships between powerful (and less powerful) 
interest groups around the world. Conservationist policies, for example, developed following the 
industrial revolution and define a utilitarian and techno-managerial approach to nature. 
Preservationist policies, which emerged in the 1930’s with the national parks movement 
spearheaded by John Muir and President Theodore Roosevelt, aim to separate humans from 
“natural” space, and view humans as a threat to ecosystem health. Ecocentrism defines human 
beings as being a part of the ecosystem, emphasizes the interconnected systems of life forms and 
abiotic elements, and explicitly connects ecosystem health to human wellbeing. 
  For the purposes of this analysis, we will turn to the environmental discourse of political 
ecology, which understands environmental problems as resulting from deep structural 
inequalities in our rapidly industrializing and globalizing social systems. I argue that political 
ecology, as discourse and practice, is most useful for understanding the intersection of industrial 
agriculture, conservation, and rural livelihoods in the African tropics because it explicitly 
prioritizes the relevant power struggles that inform environmental decision-making at every level 




of social organization. From the household of a single Maasai family in Longido, to the larger 
rural community, to the nation-state, to the international policy arena, decisions are being made 
that prioritize different aspects of ecosystems and, they are often in conflict with one another. 
The way these interests are managed by powerful entities (governments, international 
conservation and development organizations, etc.) is reflected in the historically salient 
environmental discourses they use in framing their respective approaches to human-environment 
interactions in these so-called “biodiversity hotspots.” I will begin by outlining the positive role 
that protected areas have played in promoting and maintaining biodiversity, and then examine 
the critiques of the protected area paradigm as they relate to human-environment interactions and 
rural livelihoods.  
Ecological benefits of protected areas 
Protected areas (P.A.s) have been called the “cornerstones of conservation efforts” for 
their documented success in preventing deforestation and urban development within their 
boundaries, which in turn has helped to slow species extinction rates as well as promote genetic 
diversity within species groups (Brooks et al. 2009, Bruner et al. 2001, Beaudrot et al. 2015, 
Geldmann et al. 2013, Watson et al. 2014). Beaudrot and colleagues (2015) analyzed population-
level data from 15 protected areas representing 3 continents and 244 species, and found that 
wildlife population declines were less severe in protected areas than they were outside protected 
areas (Beaudrot et al. 2015). According to Brooks et al. (2009), the sum of conservation actions 
in protected areas has prevented one-fifth of the bird extinctions that would have happened 
without them. 
Protected areas have also been shown to significantly reduce logging, mining, and other 
forms of forest clearing, and to a lesser extent prevent subsistence activities such as hunting and 




grazing (Bruner et al. 2001, Geldmann et al. 2013). While I would argue that these findings are 
at least partially site-specific in terms of what has made the protected areas under investigation 
successful, they provide examples of an overarching benefit of protected areas: preventing land 
conversion. These ecological benefits of protected areas have been disputed in area-specific 
contexts, however. For example, Clark et al. (2013) found that rates of deforestation in South 
Asian protected areas are virtually indistinguishable from rates outside the parks. In regards to 
alternative conservation strategies, Brooks et al. (2009: 1448) stated: “interventions to promote 
tropical conservation by supporting education and livelihoods, providing incentives, and 
furthering capacity building are all thought to be important, but their extent and effectiveness 
remain poorly known.” Thus, while other methods may be effective or may support the goals of 
P.A.s, most research is focused on populations within protected areas and may be 
underrepresented in the conservation literature. Bruner et al. (2001) found a correlation between 
a park’s ability to provide compensation for locals and overall park effectiveness, demonstrating 
the interconnectedness of local human and wildlife populations.   
The human-dimensions of protected area development have received increasing scrutiny 
in recent decades, as reports of human rights violations and inadequate compensation have 
become documented and publicized (Colchester 2004). I will highlight a few of these key 
socioeconomic concerns through literature regarding what is known in political ecology as 
“conservation and control.” 
Conservation and control thesis of political ecology: pushing back against the bioeconomic 
“tradgedy of the commons” narrative 
Garrett Hardin’s oft-quoted and oft-misused pastoral analogy from his 1968 analysis of 
the human “population problem,” has transformed the way conservation scientists talk about 




human-environment interactions. In reaction to this, the conservation and control thesis of 
political ecology describes a body of scholarship that explicitly problematizes the so-called 
Western tradition of environmental conservation, which often demands the displacement of 
indigenous people and/or rural residents from their historic range for protected area 
development. This process is itself a product of the idealization of  “wilderness” as devoid of 
human activity— in a neocolonial exercise of control over the region’s natural resources 
(Robbins 2012, Coffman 2007). Central to this thesis is the incompatibility between this socially 
constructed wilderness ideology and the geopolitical landscape upon which it is imposed in top-
down, international conservation efforts. From a political-ecological perspective, the 
preservationist discourse, which calls for an ideological separation of humans and nature (Brulle 
1996), is imposed on non-western landscapes that have in some cases been inhabited by people 
throughout our evolutionary history, and may be characterized by localized systems of 
production that can work well within the carrying capacity of that ecosystem. Human population 
growth further compounds these issues, as more people facing resource scarcity as a result of 
these interacting forces means more people who will have to rely on the surrounding ecosystem 
to balance their losses (Robbins 2012). Furthermore, it must be noted that the degree to which 
protected areas are responsible for the displacement of local people remains highly contested 
within the conservation literature (Berkes 2007, Linder 2016). In addition, Western (or even 
international) interests do not drive all conservation efforts, as localized conservation efforts 
have been documented across multiple regions (Linder 2016). With these distinctions in mind, I 
will present a brief survey of scientific literature that has critiqued the protected area paradigm 
on both social and ecological grounds.  




Glen Martin’s Game Changer, Robin Reid’s Savannas of Our Birth, and Dan 
Brockington’s Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, 
Tanzania all address the ways in which the preservationist environmental discourse in particular 
have led wildlife management policies that increase human-wildlife conflict and local resistance 
to protected area development rather than mitigate it. In doing so, all authors add to the growing 
body of research in conservation and control and adds to the global conversation about finding 
more locally-sustainable protected area management strategies. 
Glenn Martin’s Game Changer: Animal Rights and the Fate of Africa’s Wildlife (2012), 
focuses on the ways in which the animal rights movement—a discourse of wealthy “global 
north” nations resulting from centuries of artificial separation from the environment following 
the industrial revolution—has been used by government officials and power-players in the 
conservation world to call for stringent policies that treat local people as the only “problem” 
facing ecosystem health while ignoring the larger global market pressures that increase the 
demand for wildlife products. Martin argues regarding the CITES 1989 ban on ivory: “The 1989 
ivory ban stands in opposition to history. Ivory has never been a commodity in Africa; it has 
always been, literally, a currency, one that has sometimes even exceeded gold as a store of 
value” (26). Here, Martin draws attention to the criminalization of the “poachers” despite the fact 
that the ivory trade—indeed, trade for wildlife products in general—is driven by urban centers in 
geographically distant regions: including and especially China. Martin’s book also focuses on 
protected area development and the ways in which marginalized ethnic groups were forced out of 
their homes in the creation of several (not all) African national parks, thus increasing the reliance 
of those groups on increasingly scarce resources. Martin’s critique of CITES is relevant to the 
discussion of protected area development through the critical framework of conservation and 




control because the convention is closely linked to conservation, as well as animal welfare 
organizations: including the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) (Wijnstekers 2003), 
which as Martin explains imposes Western wilderness ideologies on animals that can have 
conflict with people who actually live in close proximity to them. 
Similarly, Robin Reid’s Savannas of our Birth: People, Wildlife, and Change in East 
Africa addresses the problematic nature of hard-boundary conservation areas from both social 
and ecological standpoints. As she explains, humans and the East African Savanna ecosystem 
have coevolved with one another in a kind of “conflicting coexistence” such that the grasslands 
become overburdened by their own biomass in the absence of moderate human disturbance. 
Controlled fire-setting is one example she uses to demonstrate the importance of moderate levels 
of human activity in the savanna ecosystem (132), and cites a study by ecologist Jim Ellis, in 
which he estimates that the majority of the Acacia trees in south Turkana, which play a 
significant role in soil moisture retention and thus plant growth as well as serving as a habitat for 
arthropods and bats, originated in abandoned livestock corrals (139). As Reid argues in the 
section “When Parks Exclude People,” these “nutrient hotspots” created by abandoned livestock 
corrals and homesteads begin to fade with the advent of permanent and increasingly population-
dense settlements (140). Thus, Reid’s critique of the national park systems in East Africa echoes 
the principles of the conservation and control thesis of political ecology, as she concludes that 
ecosystem resilience in the East African savanna is enhanced by moderate levels of human 
disturbance. This balance evolved over millions of years of selection pressures shaping both 
human and non-human existence in the region, and is disrupted by the removal of rural 
production systems for what Paul Robbins would call “tourist landscapes of consumption” 
(Robbins 2012) that, in spite of the money they bring in, do not enhance ecosystem productivity 




and in fact may do more harm than good in some cases (Buckley and Pannell 1990). Studies 
have shown, for example, that the ecological costs associated with tourists’ travel, lodging, and 
waste removal constitute serious threats to ecosystem health, especially when there is a tradeoff 
between tourist activities and lower-impact rural activities (Buckley 2004, Ceballos-Lascurain 
1996, Boo 1990, Mieczcowskie 1995, Simmons and Beckman 2004). In addition to the 
ecological costs of tourist activities, protected areas that exclude local people also force them 
into more densely-packed settlements, which may in turn cause increased wildlife conflict—
especially when coupled with rapid population growth (Reid 2012, Robbins, 2012, Martin 2011). 
Reid’s analysis builds on the growing body of research that highlights the ecological and social 
problems associated with protected area development in low-income rural areas by 
demonstrating the ecological basis for more socially sustainable biodiversity management 
projects.  
Similarly, Dan Brockington’s book, “Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the 
Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania explores the ways in which protected area development has 
had negative impacts on rural populations in north-eastern Tanzania. As he explains, thousands 
of local residents and tens of thousands of livestock were evicted from the area following the 
decision in 1988 by Tanzania’s Department of Wildlife that asserted that the area was becoming 
“degraded” by pastoralists. The eviction campaign was supported by a number of well-known 
international organizations, including the George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust based in 
the U.K. and the Tony Fitzjohn/George Adamson Wildlife Preservation Trust in the U.S. 
Furthermore, these organizations had powerful connections in wealthy nations that allowed them 
to garner public support for the eviction, as well as the requisite funding to move thousands of 
people and their herds, with corporate support from Tiffany’s, Cartier, and British Petroleum (2).  




Brockington’s analysis highlights the disproportionate influence of government and 
corporate interests over local ones, as well as the tenuous nature of ethics in the international 
conservation community. Corporate sponsorship by extractive industries, such as mining and 
petroleum, that have caused massive ecological disruption around the world but particularly in 
the African tropics illustrates the irony that the international conservation community is, despite 
its normative claims of ecological integrity, deeply entrenched in the capitalist regime of 
globalization and economies of scale—all with an abundance of negative externalities. 
Furthermore, Brockington points out that the concept of “degradation,” the raison d’etre of the 
entire operation, is itself problematic in that it contains Western-biased assumptions of how 
ecosystems work. The “degradation” of the grassland ecosystem by pastoralists is challenged by 
a growing number of ecologists (as discussed in Robin Reid’s analysis), including and especially 
Joseph Connell’s intermediate disturbance hypothesis. As Brockington explains: “the disturbance 
caused by grazing and burning does not necessarily cause damage; it is more likely to result in 
disturbances that foster biodiversity” (56). What both Brockington and Reid emphasize is that 
the received view of rangeland dynamics—as an “equilibrium model” that predicts a strong 
coupling between livestock and area productivity—is likely incorrect. More research supports a 
stochastic, non-equilibrium model of rangeland dynamics, which is “primarily dependent upon 
precipitation and the physical environment, not grazing, browsing, or trampling” (56). What is 
left out of Brockington’s analysis is a discussion of the role human population growth plays in 
influencing environmental outcomes around protected areas—a phenomenon which is itself 
influenced by a number of factors. The causes and consequences of rural population growth and 
its implications for biodiversity management will be discussed in chapter 3, but in the context of 
Brockington’s argument, I would argue that the mass eviction only compounded the issue by 




displacing the residents, as a positive relationship between displacement and population growth 
has been documented in other regions (Heath and Binswanger 1996).  
The critical framework of conservation and control highlights the problems of what 
Brockington refers to as “fortress conservation,” or the development of protected areas that 
exclude local residents from prioritized ecosystems and in doing so often accelerate damage to 
both livelihoods and the ecosystem health upon which they depend. The three books discussed 
above, by Martin, Reid, and Brockington, all reacted to these established patterns of exclusion by 
demonstrating the ways in which macro-level power struggles dating back to the colonial regime 
inform conservation outcomes in protected areas. In doing so, each highlights key issues in what 
Miller and colleagues (2011) have called the “New conservation debate” regarding approaches to 
biodiversity management. The debate focuses on two divergent approaches to biodiversity 
conservation as they have been portrayed in scholarly journals following the emergence of 
backlash against fortress conservation in the 1990s. Miller et al. distinguish between ‘‘nature 
protectionists,” who defend conservation policies that strictly limit human activity in protected 
areas, and  ‘‘social conservationists” who advocate sustainable use and prioritize conservation-
oriented development and goals relating to human wellbeing such as social justice and poverty 
alleviation (Miller et al 2011).  
The key differences between the two camps, the authors contend, lie in the normative 
claims of “nature first” versus “people first” ethical positions, not in the empirical findings of 
case studies that have revealed the strengths and shortcomings of both protected areas and 
integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs). In other words, projects borne out of 
both theoretical perspectives have succeeded and failed in various contexts, but the normative 
discourses surrounding the different positions are so highly charged that proponents of each side 




in the debate focus only on those case studies that demonstrate the pressing need for either more 
or less severe restrictions of human activity in prioritized ecosystems. As the authors explain, 
this has led to the so-called “nature preservationists” and “social conservationists” appearing to 
be completely opposed to one another, though arguably the maintenance of biological diversity 
via the protection of natural selection forces (Primack 1995) as well as the maintenance of 
human life, made possible by these same forces, lies at the heart of both approaches.  
If we understand human beings within the socioecological context for which Robin Reid 
calls—as a species that has evolved over millions of years alongside and indeed in concert with 
other species and that are subject to the laws of ecological carrying capacity—we arguably 
cannot presume that the biological diversity of non-human species and physical landscapes is not 
ultimately critical to our survival as well. The problem, then, lies in the differential treatment of 
“humans” as being the biggest threat to biodiversity conservation.  As conservation and control 
scholars point out, and as anyone who visits national parks in the African tropics can see, not all 
humans are restricted from prioritized ecosystems in protected areas, only some of the most 
economically disenfranchised and historically marginalized local ones. Just about everyone else 
can come in, walk around or ride through in large vehicles, take pictures, and stay in nearby 
lodges with gas stoves and running water. This is not to say that illegal grazing, collecting, and 
poaching are not perennial problems in and around protected areas. Indeed, the conservation and 
control framework places these phenomena front and center, just as Miller and colleagues’ 
garden-variety “nature-protectionists” would. Rather than pointing to local people and their 
small-scale production systems as the ultimate source of ecological degradation, however, the 
political ecological approach to protected area conflict points to human social structure and 
historical patterns of inequality to understand the flow of natural resources across space.  




Glen Martin’s example of the ivory trade illustrates the conservation and control 
framework and its applicability to the resolution of the “new conservation debate” because it 
deliberately widens the scope of the analysis from the immediate present of local “poachers” to 
include the larger picture of Chinese development projects and the concurrent commodification 
of animal products on a scale previously unknown to the region. Not all commercialization of 
natural resources results directly from global market influence, however. For example, the large 
quantities of animals being removed from the Gulf of Guinea Forest in Cameroon are either 
consumed by local hunters and their families directly or are being sold in localized markets as 
bushmeat (Fa et al. 2005). In such cases, local behaviors that had historically been relatively 
sustainable became effectively commercialized with the advent of urban centers, rural poverty, 
and improved hunting technology that allowed people to harvest large numbers of animals with 
little expertise—and the driving force behind this is human population growth (Linder 2016). 
Even when population growth is largely to blame for the tensions between conservation and local 
populations, it is still the case that negative social and economic outcomes are unequally 
distributed among communities. It tends to be the poorest and most politically marginalized 
groups that are asked to pay the costs of conservation, regardless of their relative contribution to 
the problem. Carolyn Jost-Robinson’s studies of human health among BaAka hunter-gatherers in 
Dzanga Sangha Protected Areas (APDS) in the Central African Republic revealed that groups 
living in closer proximity to protected areas were more nutrient deficient relative to groups living 
in areas further away from the protected area—and adult women were disproportionately 
impacted within these groups (Remis and Jost-Robinson 2014, Jost-Robinson 2016).  
Yet another layer of conflict is added when large-scale agricultural operations and 
extractive industries (such as logging and mining) seek to lay claim to areas that conservation 




groups are attempting to delineate as protected areas, or when these industries develop in 
proximity to P.A.s, squeezing local populations out to an even greater extent. These industries 
are often able to offer higher rates of immediate compensation, even though the short-term 
economic gains may come in some cases at the expense of long-term ecosystem resilience 
(Balanchandran et al 2013, Phalan et. al 2013, Shoneveld 2013). In other words, much of the 
conservation and development literature indicates that people in low-income areas are more 
likely to support an agricultural or extractive industry concession because of the immediate 
payoffs, while the long-term benefits that healthy ecosystems provide for rural livelihoods are 
less visible in the immediate present. These literatures often do not capture the full complexity of 
local responses to conservation and development issues, however, which could lead to scientific 
reports being misleading in some cases. As I will demonstrate in chapter 3, through the area case 
study of Longido District, there can be a high degree of discord among local voices regarding 
land use and livelihood, making clear-cut categorizations of local motivations to support or 
oppose protected area development unrealistic and insufficient. (Brechin et al. 2002, Persha et al. 
2011, Coffman 2004) 
Ecosytem Services as a “sales pitch” for protected-area development in low-income regions 
The notion of “ecosystem services,” the livelihood and or food/water security benefits an 
unconverted ecosystem can provide to people living in close proximity to the area in question, 
has a long history of politically charged usage and application to conservation issues (Kull et. al 
2015). A political ecological approach to the ecosystem services concept highlights the 
historically situated and power-laden contingencies of “ecosystem services” as such. The authors 
explain the ways in which the environmental narratives or “discourses” that factor into the 
creation of the term ecosystem designates an integrated non-human nature that constitutes what 




Wolfgang Sachs would call a “supra-individual reality,” which all together provides “services” 
necessary to human survival and prosperity (Sachs 1992). Kull et al. argue that the conservation 
community uses this loaded term as a rhetorical strategy, in some cases at the expense of local 
people. I would argue that this is more often not the case, especially if we privilege long-term 
ecosystem resilience over Net Present Value (the economic system of valuation for land areas 
which attempts to convert the landscape into monetary units of exchange value) (Ross 1995). 
The functional ecological basis of ecosystem services—especially as it applies to food and water 
security—has been well documented (Daily 1997, de Groot et. al 2002, Duralappah 2005, 
Balvanera et. al 2006, Boyd and Banzhaf 2007). The concerns Kull and colleagues express 
remain valid, however: we must pay attention to the power-laden discourses packed into 
“ecosystem services,” and problematize its indiscriminate usage insofar as it is a tool used by 
powerful fortress conservation institutions that draws on ecocentric and conservationist 
discourses (Brulle 1996) to rationalize preservationist policies that call for the eviction of local 
residents. That being said, there are many examples of protected areas that have not called for the 
eviction of local residents (Colchester 2004) Thus, while the ecosystem services concept may be 
in need of revision, it cannot be thrown out entirely—as it is (in spite of being embedded in 
power struggles between the conservation community and local people) one of the few 
frameworks that attempts to quantify the benefits of unconverted land to local residents.  
Protected areas: a paradigm in transition  
When thoroughly contextualized within the political situation of the area in question, an 
ecosystem services framework can help local people make informed decisions when presented 
with the competing interests of powerful industrial development and conservation entities. In 
sum, the protected area system has led to significant positive outcomes for biodiversity 




conservation, but has increased resource conflict among many local populations as population 
densities increase and commercial economies inject themselves into the landscape. As human 
populations continue to expand, the already-tenuous balance between the wellbeing of rural 
residents and biodiversity management will become increasingly strained. Thus, the P.A. system 
needs serious reform if it is going to meet these demands and continue to protect biodiversity. 
Revenue sharing must happen more often and must be distributed more equitably. More locals 
need to be included in conservation projects and capacity-building must become a priority. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the scope of threats to biodiversity must be broadened to 
account for distant land uses and structural imbalances in the economic system, not just local 
residents. It is an exercise in creative fiction to discuss threats to biodiversity without talking 
about urban markets, primary sector export economies, top-down transnational development 
projects, and, especially, population growth. To local human populations facing severe resource 
scarcities, the concept of biodiversity conservation often appears less attractive than the 












Chapter 3: Conservation, Agricultural Development, and Rural Livelihoods in Longido, 
Tanzania 
INTRODUCTION 
 Fidelis Ole Kashe, a Maasai from northern Tanzania and manager of Manyara 
Ranch Conservancy, stated: “When you are talking about livestock to the Maasai, you are talking 
about everything” (Ole Kashe, personal comm.). Encapsulated in this statement is the idea which 
has been receiving increased attention in the critical development and conservation literatures of 
East Africa: that the pastoral production system itself is the unifying feature of Maasai 
populations, even as they come to embrace different lifestyles in response to the pressures of 
globalization. In spite of the strong identity-building capacity of pastoralism, which has been 
practiced in the landscapes of East Africa for hundreds of years (Reid 2012), this mode of 
production is experiencing increased pressure as a result of the appropriation of land for both 
industrial development and conservation purposes, as well as the rapid growth of rural 
populations, including the Maasai and their neighbors. This has led to negative outcomes for 
both rural Maasai and the ecosystems in which the play a vital role. Tanzania has a rural 
population growth rate of 2.14%, having increased steadily since 2007 (World Bank 2015) which 
means that the number of people living outside of urban centers is expected to increase rapidly in 
upcoming years. This will inevitably put more pressure on the already severe livelihood 
instability of rural populations, especially when compounded by regional and global climate 
change (Tumbo 2015). 
I draw on perspectives from wildlife management officials and community leaders and 
local residents from the region to contextualize local responses to conservation and development 
issues in northern Tanzania. To situate Longido within the larger story of changing land uses and 




their implications for rural livelihoods in northern Tanzania, I begin with a cursory analysis of 
the shifting socioecological relationships among the Maasai of northern Tanzania as it is 
presented in the conservation research literature and by field experts in wildlife management 
from Manyara Ranch multi-use wildlife management area, and EcoScience Science Center near 
Tarangire National Park. I assess local perspectives of land use and livelihood in Longido based 
on ethnographic data collected in the summer of 2015. Finally, I explore the ways in which these 
local responses add to and complicate the story of ecological and social change in East Africa, 
which has been designated as a target of the expanding palm oil industrial complex, and 
simultaneously as a region in need of increased conservation efforts. I argue that local 
perspectives on conservation and development in Longido are vying with powerful national and 
international interests in the face of massive land conversions, in nuanced and perhaps 
unexpected ways.  
Literature Review: “Conflicting Coexistence?” Analyzing shifting socioecological relationships 
among Maasai of northern Tanzania. 
 Robin Reid explains in Savannas of Our Birth that pastoralism “makes sense” in the 
context of the semi-arid grassland landscapes of East Africa, the “give and take” patterns of 
which she describes as “conflicting coexistence” (Reid 2012). Following the Bantu expansion 
from West Africa, agriculturalists increasingly adopted the practices of their pastoral neighbors, 
with whom they began to intermingle as the Nilotic population from the area around what is now 
called South Sudan after the Neolithic Revolution (49). This transition to the pastoral subsistence 
economy, Reid argues, was no accident. Because the East African savanna ecosystems are 
characterized by a bimodal rainfall pattern, with one long and one short rainy season as opposed 
to one long rainy season and dry season characteristic of West Africa, cattle provide a more 




energy-efficient way to obtain nutrients, as the bimodality of rainfall allows cattle to produce 
milk for longer periods of time. Crop cultivation, conversely, is better suited to areas with 
unimodal rainfall patterns, and thus becomes increasingly energy-intensive and unreliable in 
semi-arid ecosystems (49).  
 The ecological viability of pastoralism is further enhanced by the moral economies that 
have developed around it, integrating Maasai culture with the ebbs and flows of the East African 
savanna. As both Robin Reid and Maasai elder Alais Ole Morindat argue, Maasai pastoralism 
was historically characterized by a high degree of mobility, as well as complex relationships of 
reciprocity between families and larger populations, a system that as Katherine Homewood 
demonstrates in Staying Maasai is still in place today in spite of the myriad challenges it faces 
due to globalization (Homewood et al 2009). Geographically distant yet socially interconnected 
groups of Maasai communities allow for rotational grazing of livestock herds, promoting 
resilience to the environmental uncertainties that go along with living in a semi-arid ecosystem 
(Reid 2012, Morindat 2015).  
 Given the evidence supporting the ecological viability of the pastoral mode of 
production, to what forces do we attribute the increasing and much-publicized conflicts between 
Maasai communities and wild faunal species, the decreasing populations thereof, and the 
socioeconomic impoverishment of the people themselves? As Ole Morindat explained, there are 
two potential explanations: 1) pastoralism is a fundamentally flawed production system that must 
be replaced, or 2) pastoralism is an ecologically viable and resilient way of interacting with the 
environment, meaning that there are larger global forces contributing to the decline of wildlife 
and Maasai prosperity. From a political ecological perspective, the first explanation is 
unsatisfactory because of its apolitical nature: it does not account for the ways in which the 




global economic system has produced structural imbalances of power that inform patterns of 
resource extraction and allocation (Robbins 2012). More specifically, apolitical critiques of 
pastoralism commonly employ the bioeconomic or “tradgedy of the commons” narrative 
discussed in chapter 2. This way of framing environmental issues places blame on local people 
for environmental exploitation, when in fact the ecological changes are being driven by powerful 
interest groups pushing historically marginalized groups, which are often formed along 
“racialized” ethnic lines, into increasingly peripheral ecological spaces: a process known in the 
political ecology literature as degradation and marginalization (Robbins 2012). 
 Ole Morindat describes the East African savanna as a “disequilibrium” environment that 
is characterized by being drought-prone, and he explains the ways in which pastoralists have 
“developed complex strategies to mitigate the effects of environmental uncertainties,” including 
a social “safety net” of reciprocity through age-sets and patrilineal kinship, as well as highly 
mobile residential patterns—moving to a new location every few years (Ole Morindat 2015, 
Coffman 2015, Homewood et. al 2004). This kinship system, in which males pay bridewealth in 
the form of cattle, binding two families together through the exchange of reproducible wealth, 
combined with the ability to move around, maintain what Robin Reid calls an “enrichment 
response” with the grasslands on which the cattle graze (139) form the moral economy that has 
allowed Maasai pastoralists to thrive in East Africa. This system has become disrupted, however, 
since its articulation with the global economy via the international development schemes 
beginning in the 1950’s and, later, the gazetting of conservation areas and the rise of the tourism 
industry (Edwards 2014, Ole Morindot 2015, Homewood 2009). 
 Economist Sebastian Edwards, as well as Alais Ole Morindat, point to the emphasis on 
industrial agriculture by the Bretton-Woods institutions as a leading cause of resources scarcities 




among rural populations, a trend that has been quantified by Homewood et al. in Staying Maasai.  
The Tarangire and Longido “Family Portraits” sections demonstrate the increased reliance on 
agriculture and other industries to diversify household incomes, largely as a result of the erosion 
of the social and ecological “safety nets” residential mobility historically provided pastoralists 
(Homewood et. al 2009). As Robin Reid explains, agriculture can have a number of negative 
impacts on the semi-arid ecosystem, including increasing human-wildlife conflict (66): a reality 
critical in the discussion of human-environment interactions in East Africa.  
 In Longido, attempts to unify conservation and “community” have been weak and largely 
unsuccessful. To demonstrate perennial issues with so-called “community-based” conservation 
among Maasai in northern Tanzania, I will turn briefly to Manyara Ranch to situate the later 
discussion of community based conservation (or the lack thereof) within the region-wide struggle 
for union between conservation and community development.  
 Manyara Ranch is described as a sustainable-use conservation area located to the 
southeast of Longido District and occupies 17, 807 hectares of land (Wallert 2015). Formerly a 
state-run cattle ranch, the area was privatized in the 1990s when the Tanzania Land Conservation 
Trust obtained a 99-year lease via USAID from the Tanzanian government. The local Maasai 
were not informed of this until 2002. In 2003, a grazing plan was proposed, which provoked 
conflict because some said it was “too liberal” in allowing cattle to graze in the wildlife corridor. 
According to management, retaliatory wildlife killing soon escalated and human populations 
surrounding the corridor continued to expand. They are now considering placing further 
restrictions on the amount of cattle allowed inside, though they claim that even now herders are 
bringing their cattle in illegally at night (Ole Kashe, personal comm.). The case of Manyara 
Ranch thus demonstrates the ways in which conservation management professionals from abroad 




and from Tanzania deploy taken-for granted notions of “community” for increasingly 
preservationist policies, and in doing so become only nominally “community based.” 
Jennifer Coffman’s “Buying (into) and selling conservation among Maasai in southern 
Kenya” (2009) discusses the ways in which colonial/neocolonial development initiatives have 
led to the creation of “unnatural collectives” in the form of group ranches, which are predicated 
on the (inaccurate) image of a distinct, unified Maasai community. The composition of such 
groups is heterogeneous and membership is often not defined in a way that is meaningful to 
Maasai kinship structure, to the detriment of family groups. A similar pattern is at work in 
Manyara Ranch, as one Trust member represents the entire “community” of local Maasai.  
At the same time, Coffman argues, regional and national development initiatives often 
promote individuated land titles, effectively “sub-dividing communal localities into private 
parcels of land” (168). This has led to an increased disparity between members, a process which 
disrupts the moral economy by making some people increase their individual wealth at the 
expense of their less fortunate neighbors who defaulted on their loans, a process which one 
female participant claims is currently underway in Longido.  
Conservation and development in Longido District 
 Longido District is a semi-arid rangeland in the Arusha region of northern Tanzania 
predominantly inhabited by Maasai pastoralists, many of whom were moved into the area during 
the Nyerere administration via Ujamaa, or the villiagization movement that established rural 
locales as agricultural centers to supply the Tanzanian state (Homewood et. al 2009, Edwards 
2014). To date, there is no evidence that any agricultural production of large scale ever took 
place in Longido, likely because it has become increasingly dry and unable to support such 




water-demanding activities. The area relies on rainwater runoff from the nearby Mount Longido 
as their primary water source of freshwater, and many families must walk several miles to reach 
fresh water outlets.  
Mount Longido is designated as a Forest Reserve, through which there have been 
relatively weak initiatives to distribute the meager ecotourism revenue to the community. The 
Enduimet Wildlife Management Area (WMA), an important wildlife corridor for the 
Kilimanjaro-Amboseli ecosystem, the goal of which is to increase connectivity between 
Mkomazi, Arusha, and Kilimanjaro National Parks, borders the district on the east. The area 
hosts a number of threatened taxa, including elephants, buffalo, giraffe, leopard, oryx, lesser 
kudu, eland, gerenuk, klipspringer, hartebeest, bushbuck, wildebeest, hyena, thomson and grants 
gazelle (Enduimet 2012). Arusha National Park lies 80km to the south, Kilimanjaro National 
Park to the east of the WMA. Serengeti National Park, Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Lake 
Manyara National Park, and Tarangire National Park are situated to the southwest of Longido 
District, all of which form the southern part of the continuous Maasai Steppe/Savanna ecosystem 
between northen Tanzania and southern Kenya (Fig.1, Fig. 2). In addition to being surrounded by 
ongoing conservation efforts in the form of protected areas, Longido District is located near 
plantation operations in Arusha, including sisal, coffee, cane sugar, and cotton (Edwards 2014, 
Kimaro et al. 1994) and, more recently, maize and rice (Maghimbi 2007), many of which have 
increased in both intensity and scale following the Nyerere administration (Kishimba et. al 2004, 
Sabea 2001). 
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 Longido pastoralists have begun to diversify their income strategies in recent decades, as 
rural poverty, population growth, gender relations, and persistent issues of land tenure and 
security interact to produce severe livelihood instability for many Longido Maasai, the causes 
and consequences of which was the focus in the ethnographic portion of this research. 
METHODS 
As a student of the East Africa Field School of James Madison University, I completed a 
6-week field study followed by a four-week internship, supervised by Dr. Jennifer Coffman. The 
six-week core program, which covered multiple locations in northern and eastern Tanznia, 
included Kiswahili language training, coursework regarding the historical context of human-
environment interactions in Tanzania, hands-on training in ethnographic research methods, and a 
“homestay” during which I had the opportunity to live with a family in Longido. After 
completing the core program, I returned to Longido for the four-week internship, conducting 
ethnographic research under Dr. Coffman’s supervision. I collected data using open-ended, semi-
structured interviews and a role-playing, interactive game called ERAMAT© followed by focus 
group discussions, each designed to gauge decisions and challenges of Maasai pastoralists and 
their perspectives on industrial agriculture and conservation activity in the area. 
The protocol for this research was approved by Institutional Review Board of James 
Madison University (approval no.15-0354) and strictly conforms to the guidelines of FPIC and 
participant confidentiality. All names of people and organizations from Longido that appear in 
this document are pseudonyms, chosen to ensure that both the subjects and third-party members 
are non-identifiable. 
 




ERAMAT game play and focus-group discussions: 
 ERAMAT is a “culturally-anchored” board game developed by Jacob Mayani along with 
Drs. Jennifer Coffman and Mike Deaton at James Madison University in 2011 (Mayani et. al 
2012). Mayani, who grew up in Southern Kenya, had experienced the struggles related to 
drought cycles in the semi-arid rangelands, and his desire to simulate their ecological dynamics 
and provide an entertaining way for pastoralists to talk about them provided the impetus for the 
game design. The purpose of the game is to integrate Maasai culture, life events, and the ecology 
of the East African rangelands, including rainfall patterns and the interaction of non-
domesticated faunal species, into an entertaining multiplayer game. The integrated nature of the 
game allows participants to discuss “high-risk issues in a low-risk setting.” (Coffman 2015), 
generating conversations regarding a diverse range of issues that influence human-environment 
interactions in East Africa—from population growth and climate change to kinship structures 
and gender roles. The game was first piloted in 2012 in Kenya in Lenkisem and Melepo, and has 
subsequently been played by Maasai in different locales throughout southern Kenya and 
Northern Tanzania, as well as by student and non-student groups in the U.S.  
The full history and design of the game is detailed at length in Mayani et al. 2012, as well 
as a forthcoming paper by Mayani, Drs. Coffman and Deaton, and other members of the 
ERAMAT team. In short, each player assumes the role of the head of a Maasai household, and 
they begin by rolling the dice to determine the gender of their children and then spinning an 
arrow for a “life event.” These “life events” at the beginning of each dry season represent events 
that can impact their cattle and currency holdings, such as livestock predation events, wildlife 
mass migrations, and the birth of children. Each player has an initial herd of cattle and currency 
holding of equal size, and the overall community herd size is set to be slightly below the carrying 




capacity of the ecosystem and divided equally among the players. Water, which acts a proxy for 
grass and forage availability, is represented by surface and groundwater stocks on the communal 
board, which are replenished by rain that is determined by rolling the dice during the rainy 
seasons, and is depleted by foraging cattle. Throughout the game, players have the option to 
purchase “actions” which represent avenues of livelihood diversification such as owning a shop, 
working in a safari camp, sending a child to a university, and more. Players advance in the game 
by earning respect, or “enkanyit” points. Players earn respect for successfully providing for their 
families, meeting social obligations, and giving gifts and lending cattle and currency to other 
players. At the end of the game, the number of cattle in each player’s herd is tallied and added to 
the number of respect points each player has accumulated throughout the game. The Enkanyit 
point system is an element critical to the game’s function because it models the centrality of 
social alliances and reciprocity in Maasai culture (Mayani et al. 2012, Mayani et al. 
forthcoming).  
The 2015 ERAMAT research team included Dr. Jennifer Coffman, Dr. Mike Deaton, 
Martin Mayani, myself, and Hunter Hart, all faculty and students from James Madison 
University, and Duncan Lanoi, a long-time EAFS program assistant and translator from Kenya. 
We facilitated ERAMAT game sessions in Maasai homesteads in Longido and held group 
discussions following game play. This combination of game play and focus-group discussions is 
a form of qualitative data collection that offers unique opportunities to observe participants’ 
responses to real-life situations that encompass livelihood, environment, and culture (Coffman 
2015). We conducted 11 game sessions and discussions at 9 different homesteads between July 
3rd and July 23rd 2015, each lasting upwards of 3-4 hours. Each game had between 5 and 6 
players, with additional participants observing the game and participating in the discussion.  




 A typical ERAMAT session would begin with the research team bringing some 
combination of sugar, tea, rice, maize flour, beans, cooking fat, and salt to give to the host 
family/group with whom we were conducting the session. As is customary in guest/host relations 
in Maasailand, these foodstuffs would later be distributed to the larger/extended family at 
mealtimes (Coffman 2015). The Maasai “bomas,” or homesteads, were selected to participate 
through snowball sampling via the female heads of household who had previously hosted EAFS 
students during the six-week core program, as well as through individuals with whom members 
of the research team had become acquainted during our time in Longido. This sampling method 
was ideal for the kinds of questions we would ask during the interview sessions regarding the life 
histories and experiences of “being Maasai” in Longido as well as with the interactive nature of 
the game. The researchers were able to interact with the participants following positive 
relationships the families had previously formed with the students, allowing the participants to 
feel comfortable interacting with the researchers. The researchers would also bring their 
homestay “children” (the EAFS students who stayed in that particular boma for their homestay), 
which always pleased both hosts and students. We would drink tea and visit with the family prior 
to commencing the game and while waiting for participants from neighboring bomas to arrive.  
All games began with Maasai translators, Martin Mayani and Duncan Lanoi, explaining 
the consent process and asking them for permission to record non-private, non-identifiable 
information. Upon completion of the consent process, the translators would explain the game to 
the participants, and they would begin playing. Games were either mixed gender or women-only 
groups of mixed age, from 19 years old through late 60s. Observing each game, I recorded the 
number of cattle, children, and currency units for each of the 5-6 players at the end of each of the 
4 seasons, keeping track of action purchases, marriage alliances, and major events such as 




wildlife predation and mass migration. I transferred the game results and ad libitum notes into 
electronic spreadsheets (Table 1) upon returning to the U.S. Depending on the time constraints of 
the participants, we would try to get through at least four seasons, to see how the players 
responded to seasonal changes in climate and how they influenced resource abundance and 
scarcities. After the game, we asked the participants to talk about their experiences playing the 
game, including how they felt about the action card options and inclusion of stochastic 
ecological variables, such as surface/groundwater supply, rainfall, and wildlife interactions. 
These discussions themselves often lasted for over an hour, as the game opened up avenues of 
conversation regarding land use, livelihood diversification, and family life. For this reason, we 
learned after a couple sessions that it was advantageous to have an ERAMAT session with a 
family prior to the interview session with the female heads of household, as the fictional world 
of the game afforded them opportunities to experiment with family structure and livelihood 
options in ways that provided a good segue into talking about their real lives within an ecological 
context. We found that when interviews followed ERAMAT sessions, participants were more 
likely to explicitly link their life experiences to the contours of their surrounding environment 
and elaborate on the feedback between land and livelihood. Thus, ERAMAT game play/group 
discussions and the household interviews are mutually informative qualitative data collection 
techniques that, used in conjunction with one another, can engage participants in deeper 
discussions of the cultural and ecological system under investigation—that of Longido Maasai of 

















Household Interviews/Demographic data collection 
We conducted 7 semi-structured, open-ended household interviews with 6 different 
Maasai women between July 3rd and July 23rd, 2015. All interviews were conducted in the 
Maasai language, translated by Kenyan Maasai program assistants Martin Mayani and Duncan 
Lanoi. Demographic data were also collected during these interviews.  
By talking to participants and asking them questions about their life experiences, we were 
often able to generate discussions about how the socioecological landscape in which the 
participants live has changed over time and what they understand to be the drivers and 
consequences of those changes. The sequence varied depending on the participants’ time and 
interests. It was common for interviews to take two to three hours, as they were conversational, 
informal, and purposely guided by the interests of the participants. It is for this reason that our 
Season	1 *Mixed	age/gender	group;	3	f,	3	m	25-65
Player	1 Player	2 Player	3 Player	4	 Player	5 Player	6 Notes
Children 2 3 2 3 2 1 *0	surface	19	groundwater
Herd	Size 10 12 5 3 12 2 *P3F2	marriage	alliance	with	P5M2
Money 10 14 17 6 24 6 *Mama	Thomas	purchased	Siwal	bull	action	card
Season	2	
Children 3 3 2 3 0 0 *Broke	the	borehole;	they	were	amused	by	this	and	jokingly	complained	about	paying	for	it
Herd	Size 15 13 9 4 12 2 *P3	bought	family	planning	but	then	wanted	to	put	it	back	once	martin	explained	what	it	was
Money 0 6 2 3 2 1 *Lion	predation;	Mama	Thomas	stated	"It	is	time	to	move	to	a	new	boma	because	the	other	members	of	the	pride	will	return	unless	you	kill	the	same	one"	(Trans.	By	Duncan)
Season	3
Children 2 3 2 4 2 0 *One	of	the	men	in	the	P6	partnership	got	up	and	left,	stating	the	game	was	"childish"	but	his	partner	stayed	for	the	end/discussion
Herd	Size	 6 8 4 5 5 1 *All	players	about	to	go	into	debt
Money 4 0 1 5 5 4 P6	attempting	to	bargain	for	university	card,	ends	up	purchasing;	stated	to	stress	the	importance	of	cattle	to	the	Maasai	that	"if	you	don't	have	cattle,	you	don’t	even	have	a	bed/would	have	to	make	one	out	of	plastic."	All	agreed	that	game	fosters	awareness	of	investment	opportunities




participant pool was much smaller than we anticipated; we were simply not able to fit in more 
interviews during the four-week study period, as ERAMAT sessions and discussions took 
upwards of 3-4 hours. 
Like the ERAMAT sessions, interviews were generally scheduled in morning and 
afternoon blocks, though sessions often exceeded the amount of time allotted because of the 
importance of keeping to the pace of the participants, who always had a great deal to talk about 
that they felt was important to our understanding of what it was like to live in Longido as 
members of extensive families as well as the larger pastoral community. Unlike the ERAMAT 
sessions, which were often mixed-gender groups, the participants of the household interviewed 
were all women. This was the case for several reasons. Logistically, interviews took place during 
the morning and afternoon hours, when men are typically out with their herds. We were also 
particularly interested in female perspectives on what it means to be Maasai in Longido District, 
as much of what we had heard in the previous six weeks of the program about pastoralism came 
from either male Maasai (e.g. Alias Ole Morindot, Fidelis Ole Kashe, Maasai guards at 
Ecoscience) or from wildlife and resource management professionals (e.g. Bernard Kissui, 
Helene Wallaert, Madaka Tumbo).  Finally, it was important that the female participants felt 
comfortable sharing information about their lives with us, which was often deeply personal, 
which we did not want to be influenced by the presence of male members of the household. 
Gender relations in in the Longido community are such that the presence of male 
relatives/community members would likely influence female participants’ responses to questions 
regarding livelihood and life history.  
The interview procedure was similar to that of the ERAMAT sessions, except instead of 
playing the game after the consent procedure, we would begin asking them questions about their 




lives to generate discussion regarding what they think it means to be a Longido Maasai. As the 
interview participants were all female mothers, we usually began by asking them how it was that 
they came to live in that particular boma. This question usually led to lengthy and detailed 
responses, which provide insights into the complex patrilineal kinship structure of Maasai 
culture, as well as the ways in which these kinship structures empower and limit the women’s 
livelihood options and familial relationships.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Responses gathered through the qualitative data collection techniques of both ERAMAT 
and household interviews revolved around three major themes” gender, conservation, and 
agriculture/urban development. I argue that together, these three broad factors interact to 
influence local perceptions of livelihood and land use in Longido, and that an investigation of 
these local responses yields insight into the emerging patterns of livelihood diversification and 
land conversion in northern Tanzania.  
Gender conflict, kinship systems, and the “population problem:” influences on rural livelihoods 
in Longido District: 
The opening interview question, regarding how the woman of the household came to live 
in that particular boma, generated responses that highlight the role of kinship and gender roles in 
shaping the lives of pastoralists in Longido District. For example, many of the women with 
whom we spoke reported having alcoholic husbands who physically abused them. Some of these 
women spoke of seeking divorce, but the bridewealth system has made it difficult for them to 
separate themselves from the complex web of relationships solidified through the exchange of 
reproducible wealth in the form of cattle. Thus, the life-history questions are a way to both 




engage in meaningful conversation with the participants and gain a better understanding of the 
cultural system that is in constant interaction with the Maasai Steppe ecosystem. These 
discussions were often reached through the life-history questions as the controversial topics of 
land rights and notions of “ownership” often arise as the women discuss the challenges they have 
faced in their respective lives.  
The district government, for example, can seize commercial plots granted by the office of 
the Longido District Commissioner, if the land is not “developed” within two years. One woman 
stated that one of her primary motives for partly building a house made of brick and cement was 
to protect her property from being “grabbed.” A number of the women we interviewed conveyed 
this same sentiment, thus allowing us to discern an institutional bias towards a particular kind of 
“development,” one that privileges impervious surfaces and built environments over the more 
temporary, organic structures of traditional Maasai bomas in the land tenure system of Longido 
District. This bias in favor of built infrastructure demonstrates what Jennifer Coffman calls 
“concretized discourse,” through which ideologies are made “tangible” by being set down in 
writing, including and especially legal documents (government policies, contracts, and legal land 
surveys). These concretized discourses formalize latent narratives of “ownership”, land use, and 
prescriptions for human-environment interactions (Coffman 2009)—a process our participants 
are currently experiencing in the transition from informal agreements to individuated land titles 
in Longido District. 
This bias for regulated, documented ownerships is not limited to the prioritization of 
impervious materials and physical structures: it is by extension biased in favor of increased 
sedentarization and decreased mobility, which in turn contributes to the degradation and 
marginalization of the Longido Maasai and the surrounding ecosystem. As we recall from Robin 




Reid’s analysis in Savannas of Our Birth, the mobility and seasonal grazing patterns of 
traditional pastoralism “makes sense” within the context of the semiarid grassland ecosystems of 
East Africa, and thus increased sedentarization challenges ecosystemic and social resilience. This 
system of land tenure, which privileges permanent structures, thus contributes to the increasing 
restrictions placed on pastoralists, who have traditionally utilized relatively continuous 
rangelands that are now “owned”—in other words, controlled—by powerful interest groups, 
including the government and local elites (Robbins 2012). The interviews conducted in 2015 are 
thus critical to my political-ecological analyses because they reveal many of the mechanisms of 
land appropriation and control, as well as the unintended consequences, or emergent properties, 
that result when the legal and cultural systems “lash-up” with regional changes in climate, 
producing scarcities which in turn can lead to a number of significant cultural changes, including 
and especially income diversification and, potentially, alcoholism and increasing gender conflict. 
Alcoholism among Longido men is linked to both the increased availability of cheap liquor, 
replacing lower-alcohol content home brew, and the simultaneous influx of “women’s 
development” projects from outside development groups. In other words, it was women that 
became the focus of income diversification and education initiatives in Longido, while males 
were “left behind” (ERAMAT 7.6.16). At the same time, the increasing severity of the drought 
cycles made maintaining livestock herds ever more challenging, especially in cases where 
chronic alcoholism was a factor. Thus, the aggregate interview responses of local female heads 
of household allow us to see the manifold connections between gender relations, land tenure 
systems, and environmental interactions. 
The scarcities resulting from land ownership and appropriation for commercial purposes 
discussed above has had varying impacts on the livelihood options available to the Longido 




Maasai. For example, several of the women interviewed spoke of the opportunities for income 
that was made possible by the existence of commercial plots. One woman has her own shop in 
Longido Town, from which she has been able to make enough money to build another house for 
her and her children. Another woman is in the process of building a shop adjacent to her family 
property, through which she hopes to generate revenue by selling her beadwork and small goods 
for daily use close to home, without having to travel to the market. The system also has its 
disadvantages, however, as several women reported investing money into projects that were later 
taken over by more powerful individuals without compensation.  
Also manifest in the privatization of land, as stated previously, is the problem of 
increasing land and resource scarcity resulting from reduced mobility, which is compounded by 
human population growth. During both ERAMAT discussions and interview sessions, several 
participants voiced their concerns regarding how they were to distribute their land to their 
children, as they face more land restrictions than their parents and grandparents experienced. As 
one elder Maasai woman explained, her grandparents “cleared the land” on which their 
homestead was established, and that was how they (the family) “knew it was theirs.” This 
changed with the advent of the contemporary land tenure system, however, as land is subject to 
seizure by the district government if certain “development requirements” are not met, as 
discussed earlier. Participants had mixed responses when asked whether the land tenure system is 
gender biased; some female participants claimed that their land was “grabbed” by district 
officials and local elites, who were predominantly male, while others claimed that they had 
become “empowered” by the land tenure system because it enabled them to formalize property 
agreements independently of their husbands if they had the resources to do so. These mixed 
responses potentially suggest the emergence of institutionalized income stratification between 




Maasai families, reinforced and reproduced in the legal system of land ownership. The 
educational opportunities available (or not available) to these women also had an influence, as 
women who left Longido to attend secondary school tended to have more employment 
opportunities. This apparent income stratification and resulting imbalances in livelihood options 
(for livestock holdings, which to this day form what Julian Steward would call the “core” of 
Maasai culture, require more land in order to be housed with proper protection from predators, as 
well as ample pasture area) (Steward 1955, Coffman 2015) require further investigation in order 
to fully explore the implications it has for human-environment interactions in the region. 
 “Community-based” conservation in Longido: problems, more problems, and local responses 
The mission statement of the Enduimet WMA proposes a union between biodiversity 
conservation and community development: “To provide a platform for sustainable protection and 
utilization of resources within Enduimet for income generation through eco-friendly tourism 
activities that shall address health, water, education, livestock, infrastructure and wealth creation 
for future generations” (Enduimet 2012). Household interviews with Maasai families and 
ERAMAT focus group discussions revealed divergent perceptions of community-based 
conservation from these stated goals. Generally speaking, participants claimed to have received 
few, if any, benefits from any conservation ventures in the area. Members of several households 
mentioned one organization in particular, EcoCulture Longido, as an example of “conservation 
not living up to expectations” (Int. 7.20.2). 
 EcoCulture Longido is the only “community-based” conservation initiative our 
participants mentioned, and they were not impressed with it. According to EcoCulture’s 
brochure, they offer nature hikes and “wild animal sightseeing” the proceeds of which are to go 
towards scholarships and help “provide education for the children of Longido.” One participant 




knew of one child in another family who was granted a small scholarship from the organization 
(Int. 7-20.1) but that aside from that the organization’s community outreach was “weak.” A 
Canadian-run organization, Project Twiga, was thought by several participants to be “doing a 
better job” than EcoCulture Longido because they built the community library (Int. 7.9.1). More 
research needs to be conducted looking into these organizations, as little is known about how 
they operate and who is in charge of them. 
Local perceptions of commercial agriculture and urban development: advantage or catalyst of 
marginalization? 
 While several of the participants reported cultivating small subsistence-level crops, the 
nearest large-scale farming operations lay about an hour and a half by car to the northeast, near 
Arusha and Kilimanjaro and are thus outside the range of most participants’ daily lives. Because 
of this, the Longido Maasai we interviewed seemed to know almost nothing about 
industrial/plantation agriculture; but what they do know, or at least what they think they know, is 
mostly good. Several participants in both interviews and ERAMAT games, for example, reported 
benefiting from the relatively inexpensive foodstuffs brought to Longido from Arusha, including 
maize, rice, and potatoes (Int. 7-20.2). One participant stated that many of her female friends and 
relatives have been able to earn additional income by selling these crops at the local market, and 
that it has helped them to pay school fees. Furthermore, this participant explained that the 
development of roads has made their community more “connected” to urban centers like Arusha, 
allowing them to have access to goods they would not have been able to obtain very easily in the 
past, like fabrics and cookware. I asked the same participant if she felt she benefitted more from 
the big farms near Arusha or from conservation projects in the area (we had had a discussion 
about conservation earlier in the conversation) and she laughed good-naturedly, asking me why I 




would ask such a stupid question: that she had never experienced any tangible benefits from 
conservation activities, even the ones that were “supposed to give back” to the community. In the 
same interview, however, she spoke at length about the problem of water scarcity, a topic that 
surfaced frequently in all interviews, ERAMAT games, and group discussions. Not one session 
went by without at least one of the participants discussing the problem of decreasing water 
availability and its impact on the pastoralist livelihood. The 2009 drought was mentioned 
frequently as being one of the most devastating events in the participants’ lives, having been 
responsible for massive herd die-offs and leaving residents of Longido, as well as the 
neighboring districts of Ngorongoro and Simanjiro, in a state of severe food insecurity (IFRC 
2011). As discussed in chapter 1, industrial agriculture is the leading consumer of Tanzania’s 
freshwater.  Maasai activists/experts like Alsis Ole Morindat and Fidelis Ole Kashe, along with 
the growing body of research in the ecological and social sciences, all suggest that large-scale 
agricultural operations are essentially diverting both land and water away from local people in a 
globalized state economy that remains largely export-oriented—reducing habitable areas for 
wildlife in the process and thus further increasing human-wildlife conflict. In spite of this, 
evidence from the interviews with Longido Maasai demonstrate the ways in which local people 
feel they have benefitted from the existence of industrial agriculture and have found innovative 
ways to use its products to diversify their livelihoods in the face of pressing resource scarcities. 
To recall evidence from chapter 1, these scarcities may very well have been largely caused or at 
least exacerbated by industrial agriculture in the first place, but that does not change the need for 
locals to respond immediately with the resources available to them. 
Aside from, through related to, industrial agriculture is the urbanization of Longido town 
and its implications for local residents. ERAMAT and interview participants discussed the ways 




in which the area has changed over time and how it has affected them personally, both in terms 
of their livelihoods and their social relationships. Exerpts from interviews below illustrate the 
findings of this line of inquiry—that in general, participants responded most favorably to 
opportunities relating to small-business ownership, community leadership opportunities 
(particularly for females) and educational outreach initiatives, which all participants associated 
with the increased contact with neighboring communities and urban centers via the construction 
of roads and other forms of public infrastructure. 
Mama Sydney self-identifies as a “Maasai mama who likes development,” and lives in a 
concrete house that she “built from scratch” rather than a traditional boma, which is made out of 
mud, cow dung, and sticks (Int. 7-20.1). She works as a kind of “market middle man,” who 
purchases goods from a factory owner in Nairobi, Kenya, and sells them to wholesale buyers in 
Tanzania, who then sell the goods to small-scale retailers. Her husband, who was an alcoholic, 
had no cattle when she married him: all of the family’s wealth, she says, was a product of her 
hard work as well as the support of others. Although she always “wanted to live in a nice house,” 
she qualified that a large part of why she chose to build the concrete house was because she had 
seen her neighbors “get their land grabbed for not developing it.” She also stated that she was 
“judged harshly by her neighbors” for building the house because “many people were struggling 
to get water for their home consumption,” while she was “getting water to pour on the ground,” 
to mix the concrete.  
Three lessons regarding land use and livelihood emerge from Mama Sydney’s story: 1) 
She asserts that the increasing interconnectedness of East Africa through urban development and 
road infrastructure has allowed her to earn a living beyond what would have been possible for 
her otherwise, as her career as a broker of goods from Nairobi illustrates, 2) her mobilizing the 




labor and resources to build a concrete house was in large part a defensive measure against land 
insecurity, and 3) she and her neighbors recognize water as a limiting factor and the 
environmental conflict that increases with the its appropriation for industrial uses.  
Mama Kierenne has also sought her own income independent of her alcoholic husband 
through selling her beadwork in Longido Town. As a longtime resident of the area, she states 
that she has seen “many changes take place in Longido, both good and bad” (Int. 7.9.1). In 
regards to the development of Longido Town, she stated that in some ways “growth,” which in 
this context means the expansion of public infrastructure and increased connectivity to urban 
centers, has brought benefits in the form of access to “knowledge.” When asked to provide an 
example, she supplied that educational seminars in particular have been helpful and have 
“promoted the well being of the community.” She gave the example of an “anti-malaria 
campaign for health education” that focused on preventative strategies—such as reducing 
impervious surfaces on which stagnant water would collect—which she claims to have 
incorporated into her boma. She stated that she has also benefitted from the ability to sell her 
beadwork in town and at the local Maasai market, which relies in large part on her ability to 
obtain cost-effective materials that she can use to make the jewelry. She says that she needs this 
in order to support her large family (including paying school fees for many of the grandchildren) 
because her husband is “useless.” Like Mama Sydney, she half-built two permanent structures to 
avoid “land-grabbing,” but she did not have the funds to finish them. One of the half-completed 
buildings is now used for cooking, which is ideal because it has no ceiling, the other to burn piles 
of trash. Building to the minimum standards, which stakes a claim to land but does not provide 
any functional support to livelihoods, has led to the scattering of these half-built structures 




throughout Longido, and signifies water and labor inputs that did not produce nutritional or 
cultural benefits.  
 Mama Thomas and Mama Hunter also claimed to have benefitted from the educational 
opportunities Mama Kierenne mentioned. Several years ago, Mama Thomas attended a 
workshop on how to build and install biochar stoves in Maasai bomas. Since then, she has 
become a leader of the local chapter of women in the organization, installing stoves in the homes 
of her neighbors and being paid commission by the organization for her efforts (Int. 20.2).  
Mama Hunter also participates in the project, and both women stated in their separate interviews 
that it enabled them to earn income independently of their husbands, both of whom they 
described as abusive, and with whom neither of them lived during the time of the interviews. 
Thus, the increasing connectivity of Longido with other localities enabled the women to obtain 
the necessary materials to construct the stoves via their organization, which advances their 
earning opportunities while simultaneously addressing a critical health concern associated with 
increasingly sedentary residential patterns among rural Maasai.  
 Participants from the ERAMAT sessions also discussed various benefits of urban 
development in their game sessions and post-game discussions. For example, players are able to 
purchase “actions,” or different ways through which to earn income (the amount of income 
brought in each season is stochastic, determined by rolling the dice), and the “duka” or goods 
store was always among the most popular options. ERAMAT quote of participant stating, 
“money gets you a lot of things but it runs out quickly” (ERAMAT 7.17.1).  
 The participants also discussed a number of negative consequences associated with the 
urban development of Longido, perhaps the most alarming of which is the steady increase in 
rates of alcoholism among males. Every one of the female participants interviewed discussed at 




least one alcoholic male in her kin group spending money on alcohol instead of household 
necessities. While alcoholism among rural male Maasai is a complex phenomenon that is likely 
influenced by multiple factors, a growing body of research over the past 30 years has linked 
alcoholism and urbanization in other populations (Room 1983, Sundquist and Frank 2004, 
Rabow and Watts 1982, Madsen et. al 2005). Arguably, the replacement of home-brewed beer 
with the high-alcohol content liquor, including and especially “Konyagi,” which can be 
purchased in small amounts for the USD equivalent of about 40 cents, played a role in the 
increase of alcoholism among rural pastoralists, many of whom no longer maintain large herds 
because of drought conditions and rangeland scarcity. Thus, alcoholism is likely an emergent 
property of an increasingly sedentary residential pattern in a drought prone area, combined with 
exclusion from paying jobs and the availability of cheap, high-alcohol content liquor: an 
unintended consequence of the urbanization of the area and disruption of traditional livelihood 
activities due to environmental vulnerability and decreased ability to respond to that through 
nomadic dispersal.    
In addition, the participants addressed the health problems associated with staying in the 
same boma for too long. In a traditional mud-dung boma, there is a tradeoff between smoke 
inhalation and insect infestation: cooking inside the home will “smoke out” the insects, but will 
also cause respiratory damage over long periods of exposure (Coffman 2015). Mama Thomas 
and Mama Hunter are working towards combating respiratory illnesses among Longido Maasai 
through the innovative stove designs they install, as smoke will go out through the chimney. This 
could mean an increase in indoor insects, which the women explained is mitigated by the 
installation of mosquito nets and the application of other preventative measures. Aside from 
malaria, bed bugs (Cimex lectularius) become a problem the longer a family stays in the same 




boma. Historically, bed bugs were less of an issue because Maasai families would abandon their 
bomas every few years, but with the advent of land privatization and urbanization, which creates 
less space in which to move around, families become vulnerable to health issues associated with 
insect infestation.  
Insights from Longido District: situated knowledges at work in the face of changing landscapes 
 Both the household interviews and ERAMAT focus group discussions shed light on the 
ways in which Longido pastoralists conceptualize their environment, both in terms of how they 
interact with it and the larger societal forces that shape these interactions. Having learned about 
perennial issues with wildlife conflict from Helen Wallaert of Ecoscience Center and Bernard 
Kissui of the Lion Project, many of the questions we asked participants were designed to gauge 
their perceptions of how much wildlife conflict factors into their daily existence as livestock 
herders. The ERAMAT game also has wildlife conflict built into its design, with random 
“predation events” that make the player lose livestock and “mass migrations” that significantly 
reduce surface water supply. We asked the participants following the game and during interviews 
if they felt that certain species in particular (plant and/or animal) had a significant impact on their 
ability to maintain their herds, and the majority of participants mentioned elephants, lions or 
both. Interestingly, only one female participant in all of the discussions about human-wildlife 
conflict mentioned a wild plant species that has had a negative impact on local populations: the 
Jimson weed, (Datura stramonium) a member of the nightshade family that is toxic to both 
humans and livestock and is spread through soil disturbances, often found along roadsides and 
dung-rich livestock enclosures (ERAMAT 7.3.1, Veblen 2012). 
On one occasion, following one of the ERAMAT game sessions in which one of the 
players experienced a predation event, several of the elder male participants began to discuss 




“the problem with lions” (ERAMAT 7.17.1). The male head of household, who was in his mid-
60s, proceeded to tell us a story in which he was attacked by a lion, killed the lion, and nursed 
himself back to health in the nearby forest, “living off the land” for several weeks. Two of his 
male age-mates, also present, verified the truth of his story, claiming that he was “lucky to have 
survived” (ERAMAT 7.17.1). Maasai spokesperson Alais Ole Morindat similarly personified the 
lion in his story of livestock predation and his personal struggle to maintain the pastoral “way of 
life.” According to Morindot, a lion attacked and killed his father’s most prized bull when he was 
watching over the family herd as a child. He stated: “I told that lion not to eat him (the bull) but 
he did not listen to me. That lion looked me in the eye and knew that it was not right to kill my 
father’s bull, but he was old and lazy and did not want to get his own food, and he did it anyway. 
I killed that lion not because I don’t want there to be lions. Maasai, we love lions, but he did not 
obey the contract” (Morindat 2015). These two stories, both featuring elder Maasai community 
leaders, demonstrate the perception of lions as a serious threat to livelihood security, and the 
emphasis of the lion within the larger narrative of human-wildlife conflict: an emphasis which, 
according to scientists working with the Lion Project, may not reflect “reality” in a strictly 
ecological sense. According to Dr. Bernard Kissui, approximately 70% of livestock deaths in 
general are due to famine or disease, and of those deaths related to wildlife predation, an analysis 
of livestock wounds around Tarangire from predation events since 2003, over 80% of the 
wounds were actually inflicted by hyenas—not lions. These examples demonstrate the 
perception of lions as a major threat to livelihood security among rural pastoralists, as well as 
how this perception shapes participants approaches to the subject of human-wildlife conflict.  
Lions and elephants are two species that have come to be understood, through the various 
power-laden environmental discourses discussed in chapter 2, to be simultaneously desirable 




“game” to be hunted as trophies, intelligent and charismatic creatures deserving of protection 
from humans, and, more recently, as potential threats to rural livelihoods that are undergoing 
significant changes as the global economy combines with growing human populations (Coffman 
2007). Thus, these species are caught in the middle of a global struggle between multiple 
stakeholders who represent divergent interests and disparate degrees of access to and control 
over the land itself and the policies that “govern” it. Central to this war of ideas is the increasing 
prevalence of human-wildlife conflict as a result of increasingly sedentary and agriculture-
dependent livelihoods resulting from land partitioning and privatization. As Fidelis Ole Kashe, 
Dr. Bernard Kissui, and Dr. Helene Wallaert explained, elephants trample crops and lions kill 
livestock for obvious reasons: livestock are highly concentrated, and often unprotected, nutrient 
sources in an ever-diminishing land area of habitable space. As Fidelis Ole Kashe stated 
regarding crop trampling and livestock predation, “If someone cooked you free dinner and 
washed the dishes for you, you would go for it, too” (Ole Kashe, personal comm.). This is 
problematic for rural livelihoods, including and especially pastoralists, who have become 
increasingly reliant on agriculture, odd jobs as taxi drivers, market sales, and more to diversify 
their income.  In light of Ole Kashe’s statement, we must keep in mind that as more and more 
land is appropriated for commercial activities in the primary sector and as urbanization expands 
its footprint, rural pastoralists are not the only ones being “squeezed out;” the wild animals are as 
well. The goal of conservation efforts is to lock up land for habitat protection, though relying 
heavily on the tourism industry to generate revenue, which as we discussed in earlier sections 
leads to its own brand of urbanization. To recall Robin Reid’s analysis, the boundaries of these 
protected areas often increase human-wildlife conflict with locals living nearby (Reid 2012).  




The existence of different protected area types, which permit varying levels of human 
activity, is an attempt to mitigate the competing interests of the tourism industry, conservation 
areas, and local people. Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA), allows small numbers of 
pastoralists to graze their herds, though hunting is not permitted. WMAs separate the land into 
management “zones” some of which allow grazing and others of which do not, while hunting 
remains prohibited. Alistair Pole, Director of Land Conservation in Zimbabwe for the African 
Wildlife Foundation advising Manyayra Ranch, explained that WMAs as well as game-
controlled areas, which allow hunting by permit only, can, if managed properly, contribute to 
balancing wildlife and human communities to a greater degree than national parks. He argued 
further that conservation efforts that are truly community-centered will allow local people to 
benefit directly from the setting aside of land from wildlife habitat. This is the goal behind 
Manyara Ranch, the focus of which is capacity building and environmental education for local 
pastoralists (Ole Kashe 2015, personal comm.). Similarly, the Lion Project seeks to empower 
locals to increase boma/livestock enclosure security and thus reduce livestock predation. The 
successes and challenges of these endeavors highlight the difficulties of policy-making and 
implementation in East Africa, while also demonstrating the potential for syncretism between 
small-scale local production systems and biodiversity management.  
The findings of this field study illustrate what we learned from Jennifer Coffman in 
“Buying (into) and selling conservation among Maasai in Southern Kenya:” that “Community,” 
“Wildlife,” and “Development” are all politically-loaded terms designed to invent an objective 
“reality” of the ecological and political landscape in line with the goals of conservation that is 
often at odds with the reality on the ground. We project and impose “community,” as in a 
cohesive group of people who share interests and culture and operate under a moral economy, 




onto a collection of people who are frequently at odds with one another. An 
anthropological/political ecological approach to conservation in East Africa problematizes this 
projection of “community” as such because it completely overlooks the complex relationships of 
what Reid calls “conflicting coexistence,” consequently limiting viable conservation strategies to 
the extent that they depend on a cohesive, homogeneous group of people who share the same 
goals and have the same amounts of resources to pursue and advocate for those goals. The same 
can be argued for industrial agriculture and urban development schemes, which benefit some 
individuals and interest groups while overwhelming “community” support remains elusive.   
In terms of research methodology, the ERAMAT/focus group discussions and interview 
techniques provided high potential for analyses and interdisciplinary connections through the 
critical framework of political ecology, though a larger study area and longer study period would 
allow for both additional ecological and historical context as well as quantitative analyses. 
Interactive and participant-driven techniques like ERAMAT and life history interviews can help 
researchers foster productive, meaningful communication and understanding between 
pastoralists themselves and between pastoralists and the larger global community. These 
conversations are critical, as the world of conservation has recently focused its “gaze” on rural 
pastoralists, as the ecosystems of East Africa have become prioritized in this time of rapid 
industrialization and population expansion. Among the powerful interests contending for 
Tanzania’s land is that of industrial agriculture, which continues to expand under the influence of 
foreign direct investment, and while protecting habitat and wildlife does cost, FDI for cash 
cropping is likely not the way to pay.  
 
 




Threats on the Horizon: Palm Oil comes to Tanzania  
In 2013, the Tanzanian Development Corporation signed a deal with Singapore venture 
firm Nhava Bharat for a 10,000 hectare land concession for one export crop in particular, the 
African oil palm. The project, which is backed by 111 million USD, is set to break ground in the 
Ruvu River Basin, an area listed as a critical conservation site by the Alliance for Zero 
Extinction, and is home to thousands of people from the communities of Kimala Misale in 
Kisarawe District and Dutumi in Kibaha District (Cannon 2015). This represents an 
unprecedented set of decisions that will likely have considerable implications for both 
ecosystems and rural residents—not only in areas in close proximity to these future plantations, 
but across the entire region as forest is cleared, water is extracted, and vast quantities of 
agrochemicals and potentially migrant laborers are transported in the name of increasing export 
GDP. As Linder (2013) and others have shown, palm oil cultivation on a large scale is not just 
about forest destruction, but also the construction of massive infrastructures required to manage 
production and labor and maintain high oil yields. In these surrounding infrastructures we find 
biases towards impervious surfaces, increased connectivity between forest landscapes and urban 
centers, and, most problematically, a reliance on cheap, abundant labor. These combined factors 
have been shown to result in negative impacts on ecosystems and rural populations in West 
Africa and in Southeast Asia—both regions characterized by substantially higher and more 
consistent rainfall than East Africa (FAO 2016). As stated previously, there is strong evidence in 
the scientific literature suggesting the incongruity of industrial agriculture and the historically 
bimodal, “boom and bust” drought cycles of semiarid East Africa. While the proposed palm oil 
concession areas are all located on the eastern coast of Tanzania near Dar es Salaam, an area 
with more forest cover and more consistent rainfall than its northern counterparts, I argue that the 




hydrologic cycle of the region is such that increasing freshwater withdrawals for large-scale oil 
palm operations will exacerbate what Paul Robbins calls the “shifting risk ecology” of the entire 
country, to the effect of making rural residents more vulnerable to stochastic ecological variables 
such as drought. Access to clean water is a very real issue in northern as well as south-central 
Tanzania (Tumbo 2015), and the appropriation of freshwater resources to industrial agriculture 
will likely increase environmental conflict in locations distant from the plantations themselves. 
Finally, the overwhelming dominance of Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Colombia in oil palm 
production makes it highly unlikely that Tanzania will become a viable competitor in the global 
palm oil market, especially given the more established production networks that exist in West 
Africa. To recall the problems of “comparative advantage” from chapter 1, the expansion of 
industrial palm oil to East Africa, if it makes any difference at all, will only make the global 
market price decline: which is good for importing nations who want inexpensive palm oil in 
everything, but bad news for the economy of the export country. Meanwhile, if Tanzania follows 
the production models of West Africa and Southeast Asia, rural residents will disproportionately 
bear the ecological costs associated with oil palm production in a region that, as Robin Reid has 
shown, is not very well suited for large-scale agriculture in the first place.  
While the palm oil industry is geographically distant from Longido District, it 
demonstrates many of the same problems associated with industrial agriculture in general, and 
provides a necessary context for the more recent developments in the expansion of the industry 
more close to home on the east coast of Tanzania and its implications for rural residents. In 
Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, Paul Robbins (2012:161) cites the growing body of 
literature addressing the cotton industry in West Africa.  Like palm oil, cotton gained prevalence 
under the colonial regime, persisted through market-oriented economic reform programs, and has 




recently been heralded as a poverty alleviation strategy in spite of mounting ecological concerns 
due to high labor, water, and nutrient demands (Robbins 2012, Van der Pol 1992, Moseley 2005, 
Bingen 2004). Robbins (2012:161) explains that non-food export crops can lead to soil 
degradation, which is often blamed on locals but has been shown to be primarily driven by large-
scale intensification and that the value of the crop itself is “spirited away from local producers, 
leaving West African soils and farmers more vulnerable, even while…manufacturers in distant 
capitals turn significant profits.”  Palm oil development in West Africa has already led to 
significant functional losses in the tropical forest ecosystems of West Africa. Of principle 
concern are threats to the region’s biodiversity as a result of deforestation (Harvey et al. 2008, 
Linder 2013, Balanchandran 2013, Laurance et al. 2014, Linder 2013, Linder and Palkovitz 
forthcoming).  
As Paul Robbins (2012:160) explains with regard to non-food cash crops, “with declining 
economic margins, especially under increasingly competitive global trade regimes and 
unregulated markets, costs and risks are passed downward to individual producers, who can be 
predicted to extract from the ecological system to balance their losses.” The “value” of the 
ecosystem is commodified, and then accumulated in a distant location away from the site of 
production, while customary landholders are expected to carry the burden of the environmental 
degradation left in its wake: a positive, and thus potentially devastating, feedback loop that the 
palm oil literature indicates is currently underway in palm oil producing nations. Water pollution 
from agrochemical runoff further exacerbates ecological degradation (Marin-Burgos et al. 2015, 
Hazlewood, 2012, Rosenkrantz et al. 2003). The influx of migrant workers into the area, many of 
whom are underpaid and housed in poor conditions (Njoh, 2002), effectively urbanizes these 
forested areas, resulting in more people living there than under pre-plantation conditions. Thus, 




both rural residents and migrant laborers must cope with severe nutrient shortages, leading them 
to extract bushmeat from the surrounding forest areas to balance these imposed deficits, as well 
as clear land for subsistence farming (Susanti and Burgers 2013, Schoneveld 2014), Linder 
2013). This leads to unsustainable hunting levels radiating outward from the plantation area, 
which can be difficult to reverse (Linder 2013, Linder and Palkovitz 2016, forthcoming). 
Finally, there have been numerous reports of palm oil corporate entities exploiting the 
tenuous legal framework of customary land rights and failing to inform indigenous populations 
of the full risks and socioeconomic costs associated with plantation development (Colchester and 
Chao, 2013), often in violation of national and international laws (Hazlewood 2012, Larsen et 
al., 2014, Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010, Orsato et al. 2013, Linder and Palkovitz 2016, 
forthcoming). Evidence is emerging, for example, that palm oil plantations alter the geophysical 
landscape such that locals become more vulnerable to malaria (Pleuss et al. 2009). Thus, 
literature on industrial palm oil demonstrates the severe negative health and livelihood 
consequences associated with plantation development.  
Nevertheless, national governments in the humid tropics are looking to increase foreign 
revenue earnings via foreign direct investment (FDI) in the primary sector—a trend that has been 
largely influenced by the international donor community, including and especially the World 
Bank and IMF (Edwards 2014). In spite of its neocolonial, extractive tendencies, the notion of 
comparative advantage in industrial agriculture and natural resource extraction has continued to 
drive sectorial policy in palm-oil producing nations (Rhein 2015), exposing rural residents and 
smallholder production systems to the declining margins and ecological risks discussed above. 
Matthias Rhein’s economic analysis of palm oil development in Liberia suggests that as more 
and more low-income tropical nations try to break into the palm oil industry via FDI, the global 




market price of palm oil and its products will continue to decline. Meanwhile, deforestation and 
its myriad social and ecological consequences will escalate, potentially leaving populations of 
rural residents with severe resource scarcities (Cotula 2009, see Jorgenson et al. 2007, Jorgenson 
2008, Shandra et al. 2009, Linder and Palkovitz forthcoming).  
In sum, the existing literature on industrial oil palm around the world indicates very 
severe ecological and social consequences are often associated with its development, and that, 
for better or worse, its integration into the global economy is likely irreversible (Feintrenie 2014, 
Linder and Palkovitz 2016, forthcoming). In other words, while palm oil may have devastating 
socioeconomic and ecological consequences, global investments in oil palm production are not 
going to decline in the near future. The scientific and activist communities must therefore 
continually strive to mitigate the impact of individual operations, and work closely with policy-
makers on the ground to prevent agribusinesses from obtaining land leases to the greatest extent 
possible. One of the major causes (and consequences) of ecologically unequal exchange is that 
national governments are often willing to relax environmental standards to accommodate foreign 
direct investment. However, working within the national governmental framework in the 
development of protected areas can also lead to negative outcomes as rural residents may be 
displaced and revenues are inequitably distributed. The question that remains, then, is how can 
we protect land from potentially harmful international development schemes while 









 This analysis of the development of and the relationships between industrial agriculture, 
conservation science, and rural livelihoods reveals contests over both land use and the normative 
discourses circulating around them. The colonial and neocolonial histories of industrial 
agriculture and protected areas show a clear prioritization of international and (to a lesser extent) 
national interests over those of rural residents. Qualitative ethnographic research in Longido 
reveals, however, the complexity of local responses to these issues of land use and livelihood. 
When people discussed the “benefits” of the nearby plantations and market integration, they 
recalled the availability of cheap produce and increased income opportunities and were quick to 
seize these opportunities that became available, even as they acknowledge becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to resource scarcities produced by these very processes of systematic 
land conversion.  
The scope and magnitude of the social and environmental costs associated with the 
expansion of industrial agriculture is becoming more prevalent in both the scientific and NGO 
literatures. There is still a gap in information coverage, however, between the different powerful 
interest groups contributing to these literatures. While many publications address rural 
livelihoods in at least some way, usually termed “poverty alleviation” in development lingo, the 
body of literature that explicitly prioritizes the relationship between ecosystem resilience and 
rural livelihoods in relation to industrial agriculture development remains relatively small.  
 In spite of its negative ecological and socioeconomic consequences, industrial 
agriculture, including and especially palm oil, has become so integrated in the global economic 
system that its presence is not likely to diminish in the near future. Preventing the expansion of 
plantation development into other forested areas is critical to biodiversity conservation, as palm 




oil production areas overlap with areas that are rich in endemic species. Because the global 
market is the mechanism behind plantation development and resulting ecological degradation, it 
is our responsibility as citizens of wealthy nations to reduce our own reliance on these exports—
including and especially palm oil. While consumer behavior alone cannot reform palm oil supply 
chains and true “sustainability” for these products ultimately requires massive structural changes 
in the realm of production, we can all say “no” to palm oil by avoiding products that contain 
palm oil and its derivatives. Likewise, the Tanzanian government should exercise the 
precautionary principle and prevent the further development of oil palm monocultures within its 
borders; indeed, other tropical nations being sought out for palm oil development should do this 
as well. 
Conservation areas, while helpful to maintaining biodiversity in the face of international 
development projects, must do a better job of integrating rural livelihoods into their management 
plans. This ought to include but must not be limited to revenue sharing, ensuring that the revenue 
is distributed equally among affected residents, and capacity building among local populations. 
This requires a long-term commitment from everyone involved in conservation efforts.  In an 
ideal world, the ultimate goal of international conservation efforts is to become unnecessary; 
indeed, there are locally run projects all around the world that demonstrate this is possible. As 
conservation and control research in political ecology has shown, however, conservation in 
reality is often guilty of many of the same problems that industrial ventures like palm oil 
plantations are: namely, seeking to perpetuate the bureaucratic managerial regime at the expense 
of local systems of production.  
Even with reliable and equitable revenue sharing and incorporating local people into 
conservation projects, human population growth is a major challenge to the efficacy of 




biodiversity conservation—especially if plantation monocultures continue to restrict regional 
mobility and diminish freshwater availability. As Garrett Hardin argued in 1968, population 
growth is a “no technical solutions problem.” The only pathways for reducing population growth 
are those with social contracts—between family members, between men and women, between 
socially salient alliances. Population growth is not an issue that can be relegated to critical 
biodiversity areas in the tropics—it is also our problem in wealthy industrial nations, and as such 
we must address both our own reproductive rates and our disproportionate consumption of 
natural resources. In places like Longido, where alcoholism among males is widespread and 
gender relations are highly contested and in a constant state of flux, these social contracts 
continue to evolve; and people respond to the pressures of population and environmental scarcity 
in innovative ways. Livelihood diversification is one such response, and it is becoming 
increasingly common among rural pastoralists in East Africa. From going off to work as a 
security guard in urban areas to building a local business, rural residents in this area are 
becoming increasingly connected to the global market—and it is still unclear what the full 
implications of that integration will be. As I have shown, there have been reports of reduced food 
and income security as locals become susceptible to the market fluctuations and ecological 
degradation that can accompany industrialization; yet several people in Longido have indicated 
to me that they have benefitted greatly from several forms of “development” as well, and to a 
much greater extent than they have benefitted from conservation activity.  
Foreign direct investment, while commonly hailed as an effective strategy to increase the 
wealth of so-called “developing” nations in the African tropics, has resulted in several negative 
emergent properties, including patterns of ecologically unequal exchange. As forestry, 
agricultural, and mining exports flow from the host countries to other parts of the world, people 




are finding that the return exchange value in the form of foreign revenue earnings is much less 
than the use value of a resilient ecosystem—especially in the face of rapid rural population 
growth and political instability. What is too often left out of the story, however, is how complex 
local production systems actually are. These literatures will sometimes refer to whole 
populations of people in a given area as “local communities,” or “stakeholders,” not taking the 
next step to acknowledge the possibility that truly collective responses are hard to come by 
because they rarely exist. As a U.S. citizen, I know this to be true of my own country and doubt 
many would argue with me; but that part is often left out of when discussing the people most 
immediately impacted by conservation and development policies in the African tropics.  
Finally, in reviewing literatures surrounding conservation and agricultural development, I 
have come across the same problem too many times. Articles in both the ecological and social 
sciences will conclude, usually on the last page, with a paragraph or two about what “needs to be 
done” in “moving forward.” Three of the most common lines are something like this: 
“conservation/development projects should include local people to reduce conflict,” 
“development projects need to do a better job of protecting the environment,” and, my personal 
favorite, “something needs to be done to address global/regional/local poverty.” If the last few 
pages are any indication, I am guilty of this in this paper. Instead of ending there—with “these 
things need to happen if we want to mitigate the structural imbalances that have led to these 
negative social and ecological outcomes”—we should be starting there, and go forward from that 
critical acknowledgement that something has to change, and soon. As a community of scholars 
and activists, we have done a pretty good job of documenting the many ways in which things 
have gone wrong in our global society, and how they got that way. Having said that, situating 
human-environment interactions within their historical and cultural contexts remains among the 




most significant tools with which to work through the logistics of how to improve site-specific 
outcomes, and is a critical step towards figuring out what works and what does not in a particular 
area. As Paul Robbins (2012: 99) tells us, political ecology can provide both “the hatchet and the 
seed:” having the capacity to critically examine historical material relationships between actors, 
as well as how to make them more socially and ecologically sustainable by uniting groups in 
collective action. Much of the critical scholarship regarding FDI, industrial agriculture, and the 
protected area paradigm successfully fulfill the role of the “hatchet,” but need to plant more 
“seeds” of what might actually work.  
In this thesis, I have used political ecology to contextualize local responses in Longido, 
Tanzania within relevant power struggles over resources emerging from the activities of 
industrial agriculture and protected areas—in hopes that the next time I sit down to write about 
people, biodiversity, and production systems in the African tropics, I will be able to further 
investigate these shifting relationships and generate more ideas for where to go from here. At the 
community level, this would mean finding more detailed ways to answer the calls of the female 
participants from this past summer: for health clinics with family planning options, and 
environmental outreach and education programs targeting both youth and adult age groups in 
rural communities. It would mean cradle-to-cradle designs in all future “community 
development” projects that come to the area, and environmental impact assessments being 
conducted prior to implementing those projects. At the national level, it would mean a 
crackdown on government corruption and reducing political bias towards built infrastructure and 
industrial agriculture at the expense of resilient rural production systems. It would mean 
Tanzania saying “no” to palm oil given its high potential for severe ecological, social, and 
economic costs. Finally, at the international level, it would mean wealthy nations reducing their 




reliance on products generated through unsustainable practices and terms of trade. It would mean 
investing in conservation programs that foster synthesis rather than exclusion, increasing the 
resilience of the social and ecological systems upon which all people on Earth depend.  
As Mama Kierenne stated, in response to a question about where she has traveled and 
where she might one day live, “I am a person and people go everywhere” (Int. 7.20.1). While we 
may “know” this from the story of the evolution of our species, a whole new range of 
possibilities emerges if we begin to take this seriously in biodiversity conservation and land use 
planning. Understanding the difference between 1) rural mobility and livelihood diversity, as 
demonstrated through pastoralism in East Africa, and 2) the kind of urbanization that results 
from plantation development is essential to building policies that promote ecosystem and social 
health. To do that, we need to start talking—to more rural people, about a wider range of topics, 
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